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ATTORNEY SELF-DISCLOSURE 
Benjamin P. Cooper* 
How do people with legal problems find an appropriate lawyer?  For 
unsophisticated users of legal services—lower- and middle-income 
individuals and small businesses—it is a longstanding and vexing 
problem.  Before hiring a lawyer, consumers want to know the 
answers to a variety of questions.  Has the lawyer ever been 
disciplined?  Has the lawyer ever been sued for malpractice?  Does 
the lawyer carry malpractice insurance?  Does the lawyer have the 
appropriate experience and expertise to handle this matter?  In this 
information age, a “Google” search should yield answers to these 
questions, but, surprisingly, this critical information is difficult and 
sometimes impossible for consumers to find.  Moreover, lawyers have 
no legal obligation to provide this information to prospective clients.  
As a result, many consumers settle for a lawyer who does not fit their 
needs or choose not to hire a lawyer at all. 
This Article proposes a novel approach to solving this problem.  It 
argues that the professional duty of communication that is applicable 
to the lawyer–client relationship should be extended to the lawyer–
prospective client relationship.  Thus, the lawyer should owe the 
prospective client a duty to provide sufficient information about 
himself—what I call “lawyer-specific information”—so that the 
consumer can make an informed decision about whether to hire the 
lawyer.  At a minimum, this disclosure should answer the questions 
posed above. 
Part I of this Article describes the lack of lawyer-specific information 
available to consumers.  Part II explores the current legal obligations 
of lawyers to prospective clients.  Although lawyers owe prospective 
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clients a variety of quasi-fiduciary duties, they have no obligation to 
provide lawyer-specific information.  Part III sets forth the 
theoretical, moral, and public policy justifications for requiring 
lawyers to disclose lawyer-specific information: (1) closing the 
information gap; (2) consumer protection; (3) the moral and 
philosophical concept of informed consent; (4) fulfilling prospective 
clients’ expectations; and (5) improving public confidence in the legal 
profession.  Part IV compares a doctor’s obligation to disclose 
physician-specific information to consumers with the lawyer’s 
obligation.  Although it is easier for consumers to find out information 
about prospective doctors than prospective lawyers, some courts have 
nevertheless held doctors liable for failing to disclose such 
information.  This comparison to doctors makes the case for attorney 
self-disclosure even stronger.  Part V sets forth a proposed 
amendment to the rules of professional conduct that would require 
lawyers to disclose lawyer-specific information to prospective clients. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How do people with legal problems find a lawyer?  Most do so 
through word-of-mouth.1  For sophisticated users of legal services, such 
as large companies and wealthy individuals, a few phone calls to their 
“wide network of contacts” generally yield good results.2  Moreover, 
once they have some leads, these sophisticated legal consumers know 
where to look to find additional information—for example on Westlaw 
or Lexis—about what kind of cases their prospective lawyers have 
handled and what results they have achieved.3  Their experience and 
 1. Michael S. Harris et al., Local and Specialized Outside Counsel, in 1 SUCCESSFUL 
PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 20:12 (Robert L. Haig ed., 2010) (“The most 
obvious, the most traditional, and (frequently) the most productive source of attorney referrals is word-
of-mouth.”); Steven K. Berenson, Is It Time For Lawyer Profiles?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 645, 648 
(2001) (citing a Martindale-Hubbell survey). 
 2. Harris et al., supra note 1, § 20:12 (noting that sophisticated corporate counsel generally can 
contact: “(1) other attorneys within the company itself; (2) existing outside counsel for the company 
who has a vested interest in satisfying the company in hope of obtaining repeat business; and (3) 
personal friends who presumably do not want you to lose your job”). 
 3. Id.  See also Fred C. Zacharias, The Preemployment Ethical Role of Lawyers: Are Lawyers 
Really Fiduciaries?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569, 581 (2007) (“[S]ophisticated clients are capable of 
determining each lawyer’s education and experience, requesting references . . . and comparing the fees 
of multiple lawyers they consult.”); Benjamin Barton, Why do We Regulate Lawyers?  An Economic 
Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 439–40 (2001). 
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background also give them the ability to understand the data that they 
uncover. 
But for the rest of Americans without good contacts in the legal 
community—infrequent users of legal services such as small business 
owners and lower- and middle-income individuals—the problem of 
finding a good lawyer is a longstanding and vexing one.4  Some look in 
the phone book or rely on attorney advertising,5 which are “haphazard, 
shot-in-the-dark methods” for picking a lawyer.6  Others rely on 
“Google” searches, but these tend to yield relatively little information.7 
Not surprisingly, consumers report that they seek highly skilled 
lawyers who have integrity.8  What kind of information would help 
consumers choose a lawyer possessing those qualities?  Certainly, 
consumers want to know whether their prospective lawyers have ever 
been disciplined9 or sued for malpractice;10 yet, a lawyer has no legal 
obligation to disclose this information to prospective clients,11 and, in 
many states, this information is difficult for the public to access or is not 
available at all.12  Consumers also want to know if the lawyer carries 
malpractice insurance13 so that they will be able to recover if their 
 4. Berenson, supra note 1, at 648 (“The problem of how middle-income persons go about 
finding an appropriate lawyer for their legal needs has been much discussed.  The consensus seems to be 
that there is no clear or easy way for a person to find an appropriate lawyer for his or her particular legal 
needs.”).  See also Judith L. Maute, Pre-Paid and Group Legal Services: Thirty Years After The Storm, 
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 915, 916 (2001) (“For over thirty years, the organized bar has studied, squabbled 
and lamented over how to address the unmet legal needs of the middle class.”); Linda Morton, Finding a 
Suitable Lawyer: Why Consumers Can’t Always Get What They Want and What the Legal Profession 
Should Do About It, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283 (1992). 
 5. Morton, supra note 4, at 284; CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERV. & THE PUB., AM. BAR ASS’N, 
MAJOR FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY (1994). 
 6. Maute, supra note 4, at 936 (“As one reporter noted, ‘[L]eafing through the Yellow Pages 
and muttering “eeny meeny miney mo”’ is a haphazard and unreliable method of selecting a lawyer.” 
(quoting David Segal, Legal HMOs: Defense Against High Fees; Consumers Embracing Prepaid Plans, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1988, at D1)). 
 7. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 8. Morton, supra note 4, at 287. 
 9. Sandra L. DeGraw & Bruce W. Burton, Lawyer Discipline and “Disclosure Advertising”: 
Towards A New Ethos, 72 N.C. L. REV. 351, 376–77 (1994); Morton, supra note 4, at 288. 
 10. Berenson, supra note 1, at 684. 
 11. See infra Part I.B.  In at least one state, a lawyer who is suspended must disclose this to 
current clients, though not to prospective clients.  DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 375 n.121 (citation 
omitted) (“The impetus for this amendment seems to come from lawyer abuses in which suspended 
attorneys would notify their clients in a manner suggesting that the attorney was merely going on a 
vacation or leave of absence rather than being disciplined for a breach of professional responsibility 
standards.”). 
 12. Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 
(2007); DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 379 (“Disciplinary information is largely not available in a 
form useful to the client–consumer.”). 
 13. Berenson, supra note 1, at 684–85. 
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lawyer commits malpractice, but in most states the lawyer has no duty to 
disclose this information.14  Finally, consumers want to know the 
lawyer’s specific relevant expertise and experience in order to determine 
whether he is a good choice to handle their particular case,15 but again, 
this information is difficult to uncover, and the lawyer has no duty to 
disclose it.16 
Thus, consumers—and unsophisticated users of legal services in 
particular—are generally unable to find out critical information about 
prospective lawyers even if they appreciate the need to seek out this 
information.17  As a result, some are forced to settle for a lawyer who 
does not fit their needs,18 while others choose not to obtain a lawyer’s 
assistance at all.19  Ultimately, the inability of these individuals to find a 
 14. See SUSAN R. MARTYN & LAWRENCE J. FOX, TRAVERSING THE ETHICAL MINEFIELD 18–22 
(2d ed. 2008).  Only seven states require disclosure of malpractice insurance information to clients, 
while eighteen others require disclosure on their bar registration statements.  See STANDING COMM. ON 
CLIENT PROTECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF ABA MODEL COURT RULE ON 
INSURANCE DISCLOSURE (2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/ 
professional_responsibility/malprac_disc_chart.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited March 4, 2011). 
 15. Tracy Walters McCormack & Christopher John Bodnar, Honesty Is the Best Policy: It’s Time 
to Disclose Lack of Jury Trial Experience, 23 GEO. J. LEG. ETH. 155, 158 (2010) (“Our survey data 
further indicates that potential clients find a litigator’s jury trial experience to be a material factor in a 
hiring decision, and, perhaps not surprisingly, they prefer to hire litigators with jury trial experience.”). 
 16. Id. at 171 (“Right now, lawyers are not required to disclose their lack of trial experience and 
there is no legal ramification for the failure to do so.”); Zacharias, supra note 3, at 569. 
 17. To make matters worse, even when they obtain information, unsophisticated consumers 
“might find it more difficult [than experienced legal consumers] to compare the competence and 
experience of competing lawyers.”  Id. at 581–82 (“[I]t may be beyond the capacity of unsophisticated 
or inexperienced potential clients to investigate even relatively concrete factors because they may not 
realize they should, may be too dependent to shop around or probe, or may not know the questions to 
ask.”); Barton, supra note 3, at 440 (arguing that many clients now have better ability to find 
information out about their lawyers but acknowledging that “there may be pockets of the legal market 
where information asymmetry remains a problem”); Berenson, supra note 1, at 649 (“The recipients of 
professional services lack the specialized knowledge necessary to evaluate the quality of services they 
receive.”).  Still, more information is better than less, particularly when that information is accompanied 
by an explanation from the lawyer of the relevance of, for example, that lawyer’s particular experience 
and expertise. 
 18. Professor Berenson cited an unpublished 2000 survey conducted by Martindale-Hubbell that 
concluded that: 
“[m]ore than one-fourth of Americans admit that the inability to compare information 
about different attorneys (28%) and being intimidated or confused by the whole process 
(27%) of choosing a lawyer would limit their ability to research their options.”  Another 
fifth (20%) claim their ability to research options for choosing a lawyer is limited by lack 
of resources and information. 
Berenson, supra note 1, at 648. 
 19. Maute, supra note 4, at 936 (“Even when middle-class consumers recognize that they might 
benefit from a lawyer’s services, they are reluctant to seek out legal assistance because they are 
concerned about the cost of legal services and they lack the requisite knowledge to find a competent 
lawyer.”). 
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good lawyer limits their ability to access the legal system.20 
Further exacerbating the problem is the explosion of attorney 
advertising following the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates v. State Bar 
of Arizona,21 which held that truthful advertising by attorneys is 
constitutionally protected speech,22 and advertising now takes many 
forms—both traditional (e.g., billboards, television, radio, and 
newsletters) and non-traditional (e.g., websites and blogs).23  In their 
advertising, lawyers have the opportunity to present their best 
qualities.24  Moreover, once the consumer is in the lawyer’s office, 
speaking to the lawyer on the telephone, or sizing up the lawyer at a 
“beauty contest,” the lawyer has additional opportunities to sell his 
positive attributes.  The lawyer can discuss his recent successes, his 
firm’s excellent personal service, or the quality of his associates.  Thus, 
while consumers have difficulty finding neutral or negative information 
about prospective lawyers, they are also bombarded with information 
from lawyers about their positive qualities.25  In other words, legal 
consumers have more than sufficient opportunity to hear why they 
should hire particular lawyers, but they do not get the chance to find out 
why they should not.26 
Commentators have made various suggestions for addressing this 
problem in whole or in part.  Professor Leslie Levin recently 
documented the shameful secrecy surrounding the lawyer disciplinary 
system and made a persuasive case for “less secrecy in lawyer 
discipline.”27  Addressing this same issue in an earlier article, Professors 
Sandra DeGraw and Bruce Burton proposed mandatory “disclosure 
 20. See generally Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 418 (2004) 
(One “strategy for improving the market and enhancing the attractiveness of legal services involves 
increasing the information readily available about their quality.”). 
 21. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
 22. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 379–80; Berenson, supra note 1, at 653. 
 23. For example, New York defines attorney advertising very broadly as “any public or private 
communication made by or on behalf of a lawyer or law firm about that lawyer or law firm’s services, 
the primary purpose of which is for the retention of the lawyer or law firm.”  N.Y. RULE OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.0(a) (2009).  Under this definition, a lawyer’s website, blog, or newsletter—which are 
most likely written for the purpose of attracting clients—arguably qualify as advertising and are 
therefore subject to New York’s rules on advertising.  Regardless of whether they are subject to 
advertising regulations, firm websites, blogs, and newsletters are an increasingly common way for 
lawyers to promote themselves. 
 24. Harris et al., supra note 1, § 20:12 (“[N]o lawyer has ever understated his or her credential on 
a firm web site.”). 
 25. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 383 (“In selecting a lawyer, the only data concerning 
quality that is functionally available to most prospective client–consumers comes from the self-serving 
advertising of lawyer–vendors and from the general practice of lawyer licensing by the courts.”). 
 26. Id. at 379. 
 27. See Levin, supra note 12. 
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advertising,” a system in which lawyers would be required to disclose 
disciplinary actions taken against them to clients, prospective clients, 
and the public.28  Similarly, Professor Tracy McCormack and 
Christopher Bodnar recently argued that litigators be required to disclose 
their jury trial experience (or lack thereof) to potential clients.29  While 
these commentators focused narrowly on one issue, Professor Steve 
Berenson targeted the more general unavailability of information about 
lawyers by suggesting that legislatures consider requiring lawyers to 
create and make public “lawyer profiles” containing a variety of 
information, including “demographic information,” “licensing and 
certification information,” “malpractice payments” made by the lawyer, 
“information regarding malpractice insurance,” “disciplinary 
information,” and “criminal convictions.”30 
While these arguments all have merit, this Article proposes a different 
approach.  It argues that the professional duty of communication that is 
applicable during the lawyer–client relationship31 should also apply to 
the relationship between the lawyer and a prospective client.  Thus, just 
as the lawyer must provide the client with sufficient information during 
the representation “to permit the client to make informed decisions 
regarding the representation,”32 the lawyer should be required to 
communicate to the prospective client sufficient information about 
himself—what I call “lawyer-specific information”—so that the 
prospective client can make an informed decision about whether to hire 
the lawyer.  At a minimum, this disclosure should include five 
categories of information: (1) biographical, licensing, and certification 
information; (2) disciplinary history; (3) information about the lawyer’s 
malpractice insurance; (4) malpractice payments; and (5) the lawyer’s 
specific experience and expertise relevant to the prospective client’s 
matter along with an explanation of the relationship between the 
lawyer’s prior experience and the work that will be necessary in the 
proposed new matter. 
This disclosure obligation addresses issues beyond just disciplinary 
history, which was the focus for Professors Levin, DeGraw, and Burton, 
 28. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 351.  See also Sara Murray, Comment, The Whole Truth 
and Nothing But the Truth?  Should Attorneys Who Advertise Be Required to Disclose Prior 
Disciplinary Actions Taken Against Them?, 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 953 (1990). 
 29. McCormack & Bodnar, supra note 15. 
 30. Berenson, supra note 1, at 683–87.  While Professor Berenson promoted the benefits of 
lawyer profiles, he concluded that “the underlying conditions that paved the way for physician profiles 
do not appear to be present to the same degree in the legal context [and therefore] it seems unlikely that 
publicly accessible lawyer profiles will become a reality in the near future.”  Id. at 683. 
 31. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2006). 
 32. Id. R. 1.4(b). 
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and trial experience, which was the focus for Professors McCormack 
and Bodnar.  It is also differs from Professor Berenson’s suggested 
“lawyer profiles” in several respects.  First, the consumer will not have 
to look anywhere to find the information; instead, the lawyer will have 
to give the information to the consumer directly so that there will be no 
question whether the consumer actually received it.  Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, this Article proposes greater disclosure than 
Professor Berenson’s “lawyer profiles.”  Specifically, the lawyer should 
be required to disclose to the consumer the lawyer’s specific experience 
and expertise relevant to the consumer’s case and provide an explanation 
of the relationship between the lawyer’s prior experience and the work 
that will be necessary in the proposed new matter.  This information is 
critical to the consumer’s ability to make an informed choice about what 
lawyer to hire, and the lawyer himself is the only person in a position to 
provide it.33 
Part I canvasses the information available—or not available—to 
prospective clients about how to find a lawyer.  This Part also 
demonstrates that, even if consumers know what information to look for, 
it is generally unavailable to them.  Part II explores how the law 
currently treats the attorney–prospective client relationship and explains 
that lawyers already owe prospective clients a variety of quasi-fiduciary 
duties, though the duty to communicate lawyer-specific information is 
not among them.  Imposing on lawyers the duty to disclose lawyer-
specific information would be consistent with the nature of the existing 
quasi-fiduciary relationship between lawyer and prospective client.  Part 
III sets forth the theoretical, moral, and public policy justifications for 
requiring lawyers to disclose lawyer-specific information to prospective 
clients, specifically: (1) closing the information gap; (2) consumer 
protection; (3) the moral and philosophical notion of informed consent; 
(4) fulfilling prospective clients’ expectations; and (5) improving public 
 33. The idea that a lawyer should have a duty to communicate with prospective clients has 
received surprisingly little attention.  The late Fred Zacharias recently became the first to specifically 
address this issue.  See Zacharias, supra note 3, at 569.  This Article builds on that important work on 
this issue in several respects.  First, it provides a variety of theoretical and public policy justifications 
that Professor Zacharias did not discuss for imposing this new duty on lawyers.  Second, it answers a 
question that Professor Zacharias explicitly left open: what should be the precise scope of the lawyer’s 
duty to communicate with prospective clients?  See id. at 575 (“This Article argues that the professional 
regulatory scheme should clarify and facilitate enforcement of lawyers’ pre-employment obligations.  
Resolving all questions pertaining to a lawyer’s ethical role at the retainer stage, however, is not the 
Article’s purpose.  The issues are complex.  Any resolution will have significant effects on legal practice 
and the common law, and as a consequence, is likely to prove controversial.  The Article’s primary goal 
is simply to make sure the subject receives the attention it deserves.”); id. at 641 (“This Article does not 
resolve the issue of what lawyers’ ethical and legal obligations to potential clients are.  Nor does it offer 
a firm vision of how lawyers’ responsibilities, if any, should be implemented or enforced.”). 
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confidence in the legal profession.  Part IV compares lawyers with 
doctors and describes how much easier it is for consumers to find a 
doctor.  Despite this, some courts have held doctors liable for failing to 
disclose physician-specific information.  This comparison bolsters the 
argument for lawyer disclosure of lawyer-specific information.  Part V 
specifically sets forth this Article’s proposal for implementing the 
lawyer’s duty to disclose lawyer-specific information and addresses 
some potential criticisms of this proposal. 
I. THE INFORMATION GAP 
A young married couple wants to draft their wills; an individual 
suffers unforeseen complications from a botched surgery; a small 
business owner is being investigated by the Internal Revenue Service.  
These individuals are looking for an honest, high quality lawyer with the 
appropriate expertise to handle their case, but they typically are also 
inexperienced with the legal system and lack the personal contacts that 
can refer them to a suitable lawyer.  How can they find the names of 
appropriate lawyers and information about those lawyers?  A variety of 
bar associations, state courts, and consumer protection groups have 
produced guides to advise consumers on how to find a lawyer.  These 
guides generally share the view that word-of-mouth referrals, attorney 
referral services, advertisements, phone books, and legal directories, 
such as Martindale-Hubbell, are the best way to find a lawyer.34  
Unfortunately, following this advice yields surprisingly little relevant 
information.35  First, as set forth in subpart A, it is difficult for 
consumers to learn information about their prospective lawyers’ 
experience and expertise using these sources.  Second, as set forth in 
subpart B, even a lawyer’s disciplinary history is surprisingly difficult to 
uncover.  Third, subpart C describes the limited availability of other 
critical lawyer-specific information, particularly the lawyer’s history of 
malpractice claims and information about the lawyer’s malpractice 
insurance. 
 34. See, e.g., DC Bar Pamphlet, How to Find and Work With a Lawyer, 
www.dcbar.org/for_the_public/working_with_lawyers/find.cfm (last visited Sept. 27, 2010); THE 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, A CONSUMER’S PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MANAGING A RELATIONSHIP WITH A 
LAWYER 4–5 (2009); Don Griesmann: How to Find a Lawyer for Your Nonprofit Organization, Feb. 5, 
2009, www.stepbystepfundraising.com/how-to-find-a-lawyer-nonprofit/; Nolo, How to Find an 
Excellent Lawyer, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/article-29868.html (last visited Sept. 5, 
2010); Better Bus. Bureau of N.Y., How to Find a Lawyer in NYC, http://newyork.bbb.org/how-to-find-
a-lawyer-in-nyc/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2010). 
 35. Of course, another problem with this advice is that some will not even read it. 
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A. The Limited Availability of Information About Lawyers’ Experience 
Once a consumer decides to hire a lawyer, he wants to find a suitable 
one.  Generally, “a lawyer’s suitability depends upon three factors: his 
general ability (including his native ability and legal skills), his general 
experience, and his specific experience handling this type of case.”36  
Unfortunately, consumers are unable to find this information on their 
own using traditional means or the Internet. 
1. The Limits of Traditional Methods 
Personal referrals, whether through friends, relatives, insurance 
companies, charitable organizations, or other professionals,37 are 
uniformly considered the best resource for finding a lawyer.38  But 
trying to find a lawyer by word of mouth is only effective if consumers 
know people who know good lawyers.  Many individuals simply do not 
have the kind of connections that are going to help them find a good 
lawyer.39  Thus, unsophisticated users of legal services must use other 
approaches. 
But other suggested methods for finding a suitable lawyer have their 
own problems.  Consumers relying on the phone book or attorney 
advertising are unlikely to find an appropriate attorney.  Stating the 
obvious, one commentator has noted that these are “haphazard, shot-in-
the-dark methods” for picking a lawyer.40 
Public interest organizations, the Bar, and some commentators tout 
attorney referral services as a promising method to help lower- and 
middle-income consumers find lawyers,41 but in their current 
incarnation they remain problematic.  Typically, these referral services, 
often run on a not-for-profit basis by local bar associations, send 
consumers who contact them to the “next lawyer in line who has 
expressed a willingness to take cases in the problem area identified by 
the client.”42  This approach suffers from several critical flaws.  First, 
the referral services “rarely require the attorney to demonstrate any 
 36. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 579. 
 37. D.C. Bar Pamphlet, supra note 34. 
 38. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 39. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text. 
 40. Maute, supra note 4, at 936; supra note 6 and accompanying text.  See also Berenson, supra 
note 1, at 653 (“Of course, beyond areas of practice there is little substantive information in the yellow 
pages that would assist a person in selecting an appropriate attorney.”). 
 41. Morton, supra note 4. 
 42. Berenson, supra note 1, at 654. 
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referrals in that area.”43  Second, “no effort is made to match particular 
attorney competencies or characteristics to those of the potential client 
or case.”44  Third, the customer receives very little information about the 
referred lawyer.45 
2. The Limits of Online Searches 
In the age of Google, one would think that the Internet would be a 
good resource for consumers to find information about prospective 
lawyers, but the information available online is limited.46  For example, 
if a customer types a particular lawyer’s name into Martindale-Hubbell’s 
website,47 the customer learns where the lawyer went to college and law 
school48 and the lawyer’s bar admissions and practice areas (as 
designated by the lawyer), but this is no better than what was available 
in the hard copy version of Martindale-Hubbell and is hardly the kind of 
lawyer-specific information that a consumer needs to choose a good 
lawyer for a particular case. 
Martindale-Hubbell has a rating system based on peer review,49 but 
the only ratings are “A,” “B,” and “C,” which tells a consumer very little 
about the relative merits of using the prospective lawyer for the 
consumer’s particular case.  Moreover, many lawyers are not rated at all.  
Indeed, if a lawyer does not receive the rating that he wants, he can 
request that Martindale-Hubbell not rate him,50 and Martindale-Hubbell 
explicitly states that the lack of a rating should not be held against a 
lawyer.51  This policy clearly undermines the legitimacy of Martindale-
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 654–55. 
 46. A full discussion of all of the websites that list and rate lawyers is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  This Article focuses on two of the most popular websites—www.martindale.com and 
www.avvo.com.  Other ratings websites—for example, www.lawyerlistings.com, 
www.lawyerratinz.com, and www.lawyerreviewsonline.com—suffer from shortcomings similar to those 
discussed in connection with martindale.com and avvo.com. 
 47. Martindale-Hubbell, www.martindalehubbell.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2010).  Of course, for 
many years, consumers could use Martindale-Hubbell and other directories in book form, but these 
traditional resources have been largely supplanted by online resources. 
 48. This information is not always, accurate, however.  Spot-checking the accuracy of the 
available information revealed that the listing for one of the most prominent lawyers in Philadelphia 
listed the incorrect law school. 
 49. See Martindale-Hubbell, Peer Review Ratings, http://www.martindale.com/xp/legal/ 
About_Martindale/Products_and_Services/Peer_Review_Ratings/ratings.xml (last visited Sept. 5, 2010). 
 50. Martindale-Hubbell, Frequently Asked Questions About LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell 
Peer Review Ratings, http://law.lexisnexis.com/literature/LMH00074-0.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2010) 
(“Some lawyers request not to have any rating published.”). 
 51. Id. 
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Hubbell’s entire rating system. 
A relatively new website, Avvo.com, appears to hold the potential to 
provide consumers with helpful information, but what the site currently 
provides is inadequate.  Avvo collects information about lawyers and 
then attempts to put a rating on the lawyer.  According to the website, 
Avvo collects publicly available information and, “using a mathematical 
model that considers the information shown in a lawyer’s profile, 
including a lawyer’s years in practice, disciplinary history, professional 
achievements and industry recognition—all factors that, in our opinion, 
are relevant to assessing a lawyer’s qualifications,” gives the lawyer a 
rating on a scale of one to ten.52 
Despite its stated goal, Avvo.com remains a work in progress and 
currently suffers from a number of inadequacies.  First, while it collects 
publicly available information on lawyers, it also relies on the website’s 
users—both the lawyers themselves and third-parties—to input 
additional information about the lawyers, and if the lawyer’s profile 
contains only publicly available information, as is the case for many 
lawyers on the site, then there is no numerical rating for the lawyer.  For 
these lawyers, the only rating that Avvo provides is “No Concerns” if 
the individual has no publicly available disciplinary history or 
“Attention” if the attorney has a disciplinary history.53  As a result, as 
one commentator has stated, Avvo is less helpful in evaluating lawyers 
than Netflix.com is in evaluating movies because Avvo “lack[s] the 
large data sets that help keep Netflix ratings accurate.”54 
Second, even if the lawyer has a numerical rating, it is unclear what 
that rating means.  As an initial matter, it is hard to tell the specific basis 
for the numerical rating beyond the general information that Avvo 
discloses about its rating system: the rating system “considers the 
information shown in a lawyer’s profile, including a lawyer’s years in 
practice, disciplinary history, professional achievements and industry 
 52. See Avvo, http://www.avvo.com/support/avvo_rating (last visited Sept. 5, 2010). 
 53. Initially, Avvo.com gave all lawyers numerical ratings, but in response to concerns about the 
reliability of those ratings and that potential clients would focus too heavily on the numbers, Avvo 
changed its system so that lawyers who have not claimed their profiles and lawyers for whom Avvo has 
insufficient information do not have numerical ratings.  See Lawrence M. Friedman, Riding Circuits: 
Three From The Web, CBA REC., Sept. 2007.  One lawyer in Seattle actually filed suit against Avvo 
alleging that the ratings were “arbitrary and capricious” and that they therefore violated the Washington 
Consumer Protection Act.  See Complaint, Browne v. Avvo, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (W.D. Wash. 
2007) (No.CV7-920 RSL), available at http://blog.seattlepi.nwsource.com/venture/library/ 
Avvo_Complaint_FINAL_secured1.pdf.  The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.  Browne, 
525 F. Supp. 2d at 1249. 
 54. Lior J. Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1710 (2008). 
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recognition.”55  When I searched for myself on Avvo, I initially had a 
“No Concerns” rating without a numerical rating because I have no 
history of bar discipline.  I then “claimed my profile” and was 
immediately given a rating of 6.2 on the 10-point scale.  After plugging 
in some very basic biographical information, specifically where I went 
to college and law school and my work experience, my rating rose to 
7.5.56  Other attorneys have reported receiving an increased rating based 
on a softball award.57  Thus, consumers need to take these numerical 
ratings with a grain of salt.58 
Finally, even if a lawyer’s numerical rating means something, how 
does this rating really help the consumer find an appropriate lawyer for 
his particular case?  Just because a lawyer is highly rated does not mean 
that the lawyer will be a good fit for the particular case. 
In short, while consumers can get some information from Avvo.com 
and Martindale.com—and Avvo seems to hold significant promise59—at 
this point in time, consumers cannot find the kind of critical lawyer-
specific information through these websites that they need in order to 
make an informed decision about whether to hire a particular lawyer.60 
B. The Limited Availability of Lawyers’ Disciplinary History 
Although consumers want to know whether their prospective lawyer 
has ever been disciplined,61 this information is surprisingly difficult for 
consumers to find.  In the digital age, this information should be readily 
available for visitors to Avvo and the public in general to see.  As set 
forth supra, however, although Avvo attempts to collect and report on 
lawyers’ disciplinary history,62 Avvo’s information is incomplete in a 
number of respects.  The shortcoming in Avvo’s information has 
nothing to do with Avvo as it collects and reports on everything that is 
 55. Avvo, Avvo Rating Overview, http://www.avvo.com/support/avvo_rating (last visited Sept. 
5, 2010). 
 56. Others have described similar experiences with Avvo.  See Friedman, supra note 53. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Relatedly, I saw my rating increase without any apparent verification on Avvo’s part of the 
information that I submitted, and others have reported the same experience.  Id. 
 59. The fact that Deborah Rhode, one of the top legal ethics scholars in the world, is on Avvo’s 
Legal Advisory Board, see Team: Management, http://www.avvo.com/about_avvo/boards_and_bios 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2010), lends the website significant credibility, but for now, the website remains a 
work in progress. 
 60. See also Zacharias, supra note 3, at 581 (“Few, if any, external tools exist to assist clients in 
investigating lawyers.  No consumer reports on the subject exist, precisely because the assessment is 
imprecise and varies with the nature of each case.”). 
 61. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 376–77; Morton, supra note 4, at 288. 
 62. See supra Part I.A.2. 
13
Cooper: ATTORNEY SELF-DISCLOSURE
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
COOPER FINAL FORMAT (PAGINATED) 3/18/2011  1:12:40 PM 
710 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
publicly available, but rather is the fault of the shamefully secret lawyer 
disciplinary process, which Professor Leslie Levin recently discussed in 
detail.63 
As Avvo points out, there are several situations where a lawyer might 
have a disciplinary sanction that will not show up on Avvo.64  The first 
case is where the lawyer has received “private” sanctions.65  According 
to Professor Levin, almost all jurisdictions impose private discipline as 
one form of punishment, and “in many jurisdictions, it is the type of 
discipline most often imposed.”66  Typically, when an attorney receives 
private discipline, only the disciplined lawyer and the complaining party 
learn about the discipline, while the “punishment” is kept confidential 
from the public, including Avvo users.67  Indeed, by rule in some 
jurisdictions, the complaining party cannot even publicize the private 
discipline.68 
A second significant problem is that the disciplinary data that some 
states make available, either to Avvo69 or to anybody who inquires,70 is 
incomplete.  For example, in some states the available history only goes 
back to the mid-1990s.71  Moreover, in some cases, even “public” 
discipline will become unavailable to the public after a specified period 
of time.72  Finally, sometimes state bar websites do not reveal the basis 
for the attorney’s discipline.73 
Professor Levin further notes that even in this digital age, many 
jurisdictions do not make “public” disciplinary information available 
online.74  Instead, in some states, the bar makes disciplinary information 
available only by publishing the information in newspapers or worse, the 
disciplinary agencies will only disclose the lawyer’s disciplinary history 
 63. See generally Levin, supra note 12. 
 64. See Avvo, supra note 55. 
 65. Id. (“Bar associations can discipline an attorney in private and that disciplinary sanction does 
not appear in the public record.  If it is not in the public record, we will not know about it.”). 
 66. Levin, supra note 12, at 20. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Avvo, supra note 55. 
 70. Levin, supra note 12, at 21. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 20–21.  For example, the Mississippi Bar “does not have a computer database listing 
disciplinary action”—even serious disciplinary action such as disbarment or suspension.  See Tim 
Doherty, Doctor and Lawyer Records Not on Web, HATTIESBURG AM., Mar. 17, 2009.  As the General 
Counsel of the Mississippi Bar stated, “[t]here is nothing on our web site that would enable a member of 
the public to see where a particular attorney has been disciplined.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The only way for the public to find out about disciplinary action taken against attorneys would 
be from the Mississippi Supreme Court’s online docket, but even that provides “scant detail.”  Id. 
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if the consumer picks up the phone and calls the agency.75 
Professor Levin also points out that the disciplinary process itself 
lacks transparency in many states.  The large majority of states keep 
complaints about lawyers private until there is a finding of probable 
cause by the disciplinary agency.76  Moreover, in some jurisdictions, the 
public is prohibited from attending discipline hearings.77 
There is one final hurdle to a consumer’s attempt to obtain 
disciplinary information about his prospective lawyer.  Even if a 
consumer knows to request disciplinary history from the disciplinary 
authority in the consumer’s home state, that request will not turn up 
disciplinary history in another state.  Consumers can request this 
information from the American Bar Association, which maintains a 
National Lawyer Regulatory Data Bank, for a fee of ten dollars,78 but 
many consumers do not know about this service.  Further, even this 
service is not guaranteed to reveal an attorney’s entire disciplinary 
history because, since, as the ABA explains, the reporting of this 
information to the ABA is “voluntary” and, therefore, “the Data Bank 
makes no claim that its records represent every public regulatory action 
taken and reinstatement/readmission issued.”79 
C. The Limits of Other Publicly Available Information 
Two other pieces of information that consumers want to know about 
their prospective lawyers—whether the lawyer has legal malpractice 
insurance and whether the lawyer has any malpractice judgments against 
him—are also difficult, if not impossible, for consumers to discover. 
1. Malpractice Payments 
Just as consumers want to know whether a prospective lawyer has 
ever been disciplined because it may make that lawyer more likely to 
engage in misconduct in the future, consumers want to know if their 
prospective lawyer has ever lost a malpractice case because that might 
indicate that the lawyer is more likely to commit malpractice again in 
 75. Levin, supra note 12, at 20. 
 76. Id. at 19 (noting that only four states—Florida, New Hampshire, Oregon and West 
Virginia—“treat all or most complaints about lawyers as a matter of public record”). 
 77. Id. at 20 n.124 (noting that Alabama, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Nevada, 
Utah, Wyoming, Missouri, New York and Texas prohibit the public from attending disciplinary 
hearings). 
 78. ABA Regulation Databank, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/regulation/databank.html (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2010). 
 79. Id. 
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the future.80  This information is not readily available, however.  If the 
lawyer made a payment as part of a settlement, that information is 
generally confidential, and the consumer will not have a way to find out 
about it.  As for malpractice judgments, consumers might be able to find 
out about at least some of them through a careful search of court records 
and online sources, such as Westlaw or Lexis, but most consumers do 
not have the knowledge or skill to discover this information on their 
own. 
2. Malpractice Insurance 
Consumers want to know whether a prospective lawyer has 
malpractice insurance for a simple reason: “As in any other commercial 
transaction involving personal services, clients prefer attorneys who can 
reimburse them for damages resulting from inadequate legal services.”81  
This information generally remains out of the reach of consumers, 
however.  The ABA, apparently recognizing consumers’ interest in this 
information, has adopted a model court rule that would require lawyers 
to disclose whether they carry malpractice insurance to the state bar, 
though not directly to consumers,82 and eighteen states follow some 
form of this rule.83  Only seven states require lawyers to disclose this 
information directly to consumers.84  Thus, in half of the states, this 
information is not publicly available at all, and in forty-three states, 
consumers will not get this information unless they know to request it 
from the state bar. 
 80. Berenson, supra note 1, at 645. 
 81. John P. Sahl, The Public Hazard of Lawyer Self-Regulation: Learning from Ohio’s Struggles 
to Reform Its Disciplinary System, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 65, 103 (1999); Berenson, supra note 1, at 684–85 
(recommending that information regarding malpractice insurance be included in his proposed lawyer 
profiles). 
 82. See ABA Insurance Disclosure, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/clientpro/ 
Model_Rule_InsuranceDisclosure.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (“Each lawyer admitted to the active 
practice of law shall certify to the [highest court of the jurisdiction] on or before [December 31 of each 
year]: 1) whether the lawyer is engaged in the private practice of law; 2) if engaged in the private 
practice of law, whether the lawyer is currently covered by professional liability insurance; 3) whether 
the lawyer intends to maintain insurance during the period of time the lawyer is engaged in the private 
practice of law; and 4) whether the lawyer is exempt from the provisions of this Rule because the lawyer 
is engaged in the practice of law as a full-time government lawyer or is counsel employed by an 
organizational client and does not represent clients outside that capacity.  Each lawyer admitted to the 
active practice of law in this jurisdiction who reports being covered by professional liability insurance 
shall notify [the highest court in the jurisdiction] in writing within 30 days if the insurance policy 
providing coverage lapses, is no longer in effect or terminates for any reason.”). 
 83. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 84. See STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROTECTION, supra note 14. 
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II. THE LAWYER–PROSPECTIVE CLIENT RELATIONSHIP UNDER CURRENT 
LAW 
Having reviewed the difficulties facing consumers in finding out 
information about prospective lawyers on their own, the next question is 
whether, under current law, those prospective lawyers have any 
affirmative duty to disclose that information to consumers.  As set forth 
in this Part, the answer is no.  Although lawyers cannot lie if a 
prospective client asks them a direct question, they have no affirmative 
obligation to disclose lawyer-specific information. 
The duties owed by a lawyer to a prospective client fall into two 
categories: those imposed by the rules of professional conduct and those 
imposed by all other generally applicable law.85  As set forth in subpart 
A, the rules of professional conduct impose a wide variety of quasi-
fiduciary obligations on lawyers in dealing with prospective clients, but 
those obligations do not include the duty to disclose lawyer-specific 
information.  Moreover, as set forth in subpart B, under the law of fraud, 
which applies to lawyers just as it applies to everybody else – a lawyer 
cannot make an affirmative misrepresentation to a prospective client, but 
he can remain silent about his qualifications.  In other words, the lawyer 
has no affirmative duty to disclose lawyer-specific information under the 
law of fraud, just as he has no duty to disclose that information under the 
rules of professional conduct. 
A. Lawyers’ Duties to Prospective Clients Under the Rules of 
Professional Conduct 
When a person “discusses with a lawyer the possibility of forming a 
client–lawyer relationship with respect to a matter,” the rules of 
professional conduct define that person as a “prospective client.”86  
Although there is some disagreement as to how to characterize the 
lawyer’s relationship with a prospective client—courts and 
commentators disagree on whether to characterize it as a fiduciary 
relationship or an arms-length relationship87—it is clear that the rules of 
 85. MARTYN & FOX, supra note 14, at 18–20. 
 86. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18(a) (2006).  A lawyer–client relationship does not 
exist until the prospective client has “manifest[ed] to a lawyer [his] intent that the lawyer provides legal 
services . . . and either (a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or (2) the lawyer fails to 
manifest lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person 
reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (2000). 
 87. See Nolan v. Foreman, 665 F.2d 738, 739 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The fiduciary relationship 
between an attorney and his client extends even to preliminary consultations between the client and the 
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professional conduct impose certain important “fiduciary-like” duties on 
lawyers in their relationship with prospective clients.88  As set forth in 
this subpart, these “fiduciary-like” duties impose significant obligations 
on the lawyer far beyond those of the typical party to a negotiation. 
First, although it would appear that “lawyers are free to bargain with 
[prospective] clients at arms length before they enter into a client–
lawyer relationship,” the rules of professional conduct actually impose 
significant restraints on lawyers “in the context of contractual fee 
negotiations.”89  Thus, the rules protect prospective clients by requiring 
lawyers to be forthcoming during fee negotiations and communicate the 
“basis or rate of the fee [and expenses for which the client will be 
responsible] preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time 
after commencing the representation.”90  As one commentator 
explained, in the context of the negotiating process with prospective 
clients
require that a lawyer present the client with information regarding the fee 
arrangement that approximates what the client would obtain if the client 
consulted a second lawyer for assistance in negotiating the fee 
arrangement with the primary lawyer.  Fairness is to be determined 
according to a heightened fiduciary standard rather than the arms-length 
marketplace standard.91 
In addition to this obligation to communicate information about their 
fees, the rules impose limits on what lawyers can charge clients.  
Lawyers may not charge anything they want to; rather, the rules protect 
attorney regarding the attorney’s possible retention.”); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 
580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978) (“The fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client 
extends to preliminary consultation by a prospective client with a view to retention of the lawyer, 
although actual employment does not result.”); Zacharias, supra note 3, at 573 n.4–5 (collecting 
authorities); see also Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the 
Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 55 (1989) (arguing that a fiduciary duty “attaches whenever 
a potential client approaches a lawyer in a professional capacity—even to seek information about the 
lawyer’s fee”).  But see Ramirez v. Sturdevant, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554, 558 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (noting 
that “in general, the negotiation of a fee agreement is an arm’s-length transaction”) (citation omitted). 
 88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 15 cmt. b (2000) (noting 
that “prospective clients should receive some but not all of the protection afforded clients”); see also 
Vincent R. Johnson & Shawn M. Lovorn, Misrepresentation by Lawyers About Credentials or 
Experience, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 529, 545 (2004) (“[T]he lawyer does not owe a prospective client the full 
range of fiduciary duties that are owed to clients.”). 
 89. MARTYN & FOX, supra note 14, at 400. 
 90. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (2006).  See also id. R. 1.5(c) (requiring 
contingent fee agreements to be in writing).  Some states require written retainer agreements in all or 
nearly all cases.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6148 (West 2009).  Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 
1.5(b) also suggests that the “scope of the representation” be in writing. 
 91. Lester Brickman, The Continuing Assault on the Citadel of Fiduciary Protection: Ethics 
2000’s Revision of Model Rule 1.5, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1182, 1182. 
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In addition to this general prohibition on unreasonable fees, lawyers 
are forbidden from entering into a wide variety
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matter or a criminal case;94 
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 a lawyer m
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 a lawyer may not “provide financial assista
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Thus, the rules provide prospective clients with a broad 
otections with regard to fee negotiations and arrangements.99 
Second, the professional rules require the lawyer to inform the 
prospective client if the lawyer has a conflict of interest and, assuming 
that the conflict is consentable, the lawyer must obtain the prospective 
client’s consent to the lawyer’s representation despite the conflict.100  As 
part of the process of obtaining consent, the lawyer must inform the 
prospective clie
 
 92. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 (2000) (“A lawyer may not charge a fee larger than is reasonable in the 
ircum
F’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d) (2006). 
.2(b). 
ox, 851 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (N.Y. 
s). 
7(b) (2006). 
c stances or that is prohibited by law.”). 
 93. In re Sinnott, 845 A.2d 373, 379 (Vt. 2004). 
 94. MODEL RULES OF PRO
 95. Id. R. 1.5(e), 7
 96. Id. R. 1.8(d). 
 97. Id. R. 1.8(e). 
 98. Id. R. 1.8(i). 
 99. See Walton v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P., 149 S.W.3d 834, 847 (Tex. App. 2004) 
(noting that even an informed client cannot ratify a fee agreement that “violates public policy”), vacated, 
Walton/Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P. v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P./Walton, No. 08-03-00366-
CV, 2007 WL 416694 (Tex. App. Feb. 8, 2007).  But see King v. F
2006); Zacharias, supra note 3, at 610, n.137 (collecting authoritie
 100. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.
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 conflict.101 
Third, lawyers have an obligation to keep the confidences of 
prospective clients.102  This is essentially the same duty of 
confidentiality that lawyers owe current and former clients.103  Thus, 
when a lawyer meets with a prospective client to talk about taking on a 
case, the lawyer must keep the conversation confidential eve
e lawyer is usually not being paid for the initial consultation. 
Fourth, lawyers owe prospective clients a limited duty of loyalty and 
must in some circumstances avoid taking on clients whose interests 
conflict with those of prospective clients.104  Even if the lawyer does not 
take the prospective client’s case, the information that he has learned can 
prevent him from taking on a “client with interests materially adverse to 
those of a 
tter.”105 
Finally, lawyers owe the same duty of competence to prospective 
clients that they owe to clients.106  If the lawyer provides the prospective 
client with any legal advice, the lawyer must use the same level of “legal 
knowledge, ski
r a client.107 
As this discussion demonstrates, lawyers already owe prospective 
clients many of the same duties that they owe to clients.  The only 
significant duty that they ow
In addition to the applicable rules of professional conduct, lawyers are 
subject to a vast array of statutory and common law,109 including the law 
of fraud.110  In a 2004 article, Vincent Johnson and Shawn Lovorn 
 101. Id. R. 7; Zacharias, supra note 3, at 580. 
 102. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18(b) (2006). 
c). 
nce of a lawyer who gives assistance on the 
eri
ective client 
does not impose any affirmative obligation on the lawyer 
 103. See id. R. 6, 1.9. 
 104. Id. R. 18(b), (
 105. Id. R. 18(c). 
 106. Id. R. 1.18 cmt. 9 (“For the duty of compete
m ts of a matter to a prospective client, see Rule 1.1.”). 
 107. See id. R. 1.1.  Arguably, the very act of giving legal advice converts the prosp
into a client.  See Togstad v. Vesley, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980). 
 108. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2006).  Rule 7.1 does impose a general 
obligation on lawyers not to “make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the 
lawyer’s service,” see id. R. 7.1, but this rule 
to communicate lawyer-specific information. 
 109. See MARTYN & FOX, supra note 14. 
 110. Id. at 139–44.  See also Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 31 (Cal. 
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t, but 
he has no affirmative duty to disclose lawyer-specific information. 
1. Affirmative Misstatements/Outright Lies 
ls, and courts have found them liable for fraud in 
such circumstances.113 
2. Potentially Misleading Statements 
n the protection that 
co
analyzed whether lawyers commit fraud when they make misleading 
assertions about their own credentials or fail to disclose unfavorable 
information concerning their credentials.111  Johnson and Lovorn 
considered three distinct types of conduct: (1) outright lies; (2) 
“potentially misleading statements, such as half-truths and statements of 
opinion;” and (3) silence.112  As set forth in this subpart, they concluded 
that, as a general matter, a lawyer cannot lie to his prospective clien
The easy case involving fraud is one in which a lawyer tells an 
outright lie.  For example, a lawyer commits fraud by stating that he is 
an experienced criminal defense lawyer when in fact he has never 
handled any criminal cases.  Lawyers may not lie about their experience 
and academic credentia
A slightly more complicated situation occurs when a lawyer makes 
potentially misleading statements, although those statements may not 
constitute outright lies.  For example, if a lawyer with solid civil 
litigation experience but no criminal experience tries to retain a 
prospective criminal client by saying: “I have extensive experience and 
am sure that I can do an excellent job for you,” but does not tell the 
prospective client that he has no criminal experience, the attorney has 
not told the client an outright lie, but the statement is potentially 
misleading.  A lawyer is unlikely to face liability for fraud based on this 
particular kind of “half-truth,” particularly give
urts traditionally give to statements of opinion. 
 
Ct. App. 2004) (“A fraud claim against a lawyer is no different than a fraud claim against anyone else.”). 
 111. Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 529. 
 112. Although fraud generally requires an intentional, knowing, or reckless misstatement, 
attorneys and other professionals have also been held liable for making negligent misrepresentations.  
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) (emphasis added) (“One who, in the course of his 
business, profession or employment . . . supplies false information for the guidance of others in their 
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance 
upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or 
communicating the information.” (emphasis added)); see also Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 
564–68. 
 113. Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 423–24 (2d Cir. 2000) (Lawyer claimed experience that he 
did not have.); Miller v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp., 855 F. Supp. 691 (D.N.J. 1994) (Lawyer claimed 
academic credentials that he did not have.). 
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plined for describing 
him
t make a “false or grossly misleading statement” that 
de
e the client’s case.  
 
Courts have, on occasion, imposed liability for half-truths.  Although 
an individual is generally safe saying nothing, once a person 
“voluntarily elects to make a partial disclosure, [he] is deemed to have 
assumed a duty to tell the whole truth.”114  As the Restatement of Torts 
provides: a person makes a fraudulent misrepresentation when he 
“stat[es] the truth so far as it goes,” but the speaker “knows or believes” 
the statement as a whole to be “materially misleading” because the 
speaker has omitted “additional or qualifying matter.”115  In one case, a 
lawyer who had taken inactive status was disci
self as an “attorney” on a form submitted to a state agency in 
connection with his campaign for public office.116 
Although half-truths can be actionable, lawyers, like other 
professionals, are generally entitled to engage in “puffing”—what one 
court called “a healthy self-estimation.”117  Courts generally consider 
puffing to be “a nonactionable assertion of opinion”118 as long as the 
lawyer does no
monstrates “an intent to create a false impression of expertise or 
experience.”119 
In light of this high standard, the lawyer with good civil experience 
but no criminal experience, who tells his prospective criminal client, “I 
have extensive experience and am sure that I can do an excellent job for 
you,” is unlikely to face liability.  His statement that he has “extensive 
experience” is somewhat deceptive, but probably not “grossly 
misleading,” and, moreover, the lawyer’s extensive civil experience is 
somewhat relevant to his ability to ably handl
 114. Union Pac. Res. Group, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 247 F.3d 574, 584 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529 (1977).  See also Meade v. Cedarapids, Inc., 164 
F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 1999) (“‘[O]ne who makes a representation that is misleading because it is in 
the nature of a half-truth assumes the obligation to make a full and fair disclosure of the whole truth.’” 
(quoting Gregory v. Novak, 855 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Or. Ct. App. 1993))); Morales v. Morales, 98 S.W.3d 
343, 347 (Tex. App. 2003) (“[W]hen one voluntarily discloses information, he has a duty to disclose the 
whole truth rather than making a partial disclosure that conveys a false impression.” (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 116. In re Conduct of Kumley, 75 P.3d 432, 435 (Or. 2003). 
 117. Baker, 239 F.3d at 423. 
 118. Miller v. William Chevrolet/GEO, Inc., 762 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); W. PAGE 
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS 757 (5th ed. 1984) (“[S]ales talk, or puffing . . . is 
considered to be offered and understood as an expression of the seller’s opinion only . . . on which no 
reasonable man would rely.”). 
 119. Griffin v. Fowler, 579 S.E.2d 848, 853 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 
88, at 552 (“[S]tatements that extend beyond expressing a favorable opinion, and instead assert false 
facts, are actionable.”).  Johnson and Lovorn further note that puffing is also actionable if (1) the speaker 
does not actually have confidence in the opinion he is expressing about his talents; (2) the speaker has 
no factual basis for stating the view he expressed; or (3) the “facts known to the speaker are . . . wholly 
inconsistent with the opinion voiced.”  Id. 
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Moreover, his belief that he “ xcellent job” for the client is 
probably nothing more than nonactionable puffing. 
 misstatement,120 so a lawyer who says nothing to a 
pr
dictment.”126  Thus, under this exception, the lawyer does 
no
 
can do an e
3. Silence 
To state a cause of action for fraud, a plaintiff generally must point to 
an affirmative
ospective client about the lawyer’s credentials or the lawyer’s prior 
discipline, usually cannot be sued for fraud.121  In other words, “silence 
is golden.”122 
As Johnson and Lovorn note, however, there are three exceptions to 
this basic rule,123 though none of these exceptions apply to the typical 
lawyer–prospective client relationship.  First, an individual must 
disclose “facts basic to the transaction” to the opposing party if he 
knows that the opposing party is about to enter into the transaction 
operating under a mistake as to those basic facts, and that the opposing 
party, “because of the relationship between them, the customs of the 
trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a 
disclosure of those facts.”124  Although this exception sounds like it 
might fit the lawyer–prospective client relationship, the comments to the 
Restatement make clear that this exception is narrow and applies only 
when the party’s conduct is “so shocking to the ethical sense of the 
community, and is so extreme and unfair, as to amount to a form of 
swindling, in which the plaintiff is led by appearances into a bargain that 
is a trap, of whose essence and substance he is unaware.”125  Consistent 
with this standard, this exception applies to the attorney–prospective 
client situation “only in the rarest of cases . . . such as where a lawyer 
fails to disclose that he is presently suspended from the practice of law 
[or] under in
t have to disclose lawyer-specific information such as prior discipline, 
 120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977). 
 121. Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 536 (“It has long been said that ‘silence is golden.’  
This rule applies in the legal arena, as in other contexts.  In general, there is no duty to disclose 
information merely because another person would find that information useful, interesting, or 
beneficial.”). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 536–37. 
 124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977) (emphasis added); Johnson & Lovorn, 
supra note 88, at 537–38. 
 125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 551 cmt. 1 (1977). 
 126. Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 538 (collecting cases).  Johnson and Lovorn also state 
that this exception would apply to an attorney’s failure to disclose that he is “addicted to illegal drugs,” 
but they cite to cases involving doctors not lawyers.  Id.  Research for this Article did not reveal any 
cases in which lawyers were found liable for failing to disclose their addiction to illegal drugs. 
23
Cooper: ATTORNEY SELF-DISCLOSURE
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
COOPER FINAL FORMAT (PAGINATED) 3/18/2011  1:12:40 PM 
720 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
ld be no incentive for parties “to actively 
pr
t some lawyer-specific information 
is 
speak.”   Although lawyers certainly owe many quasi-fiduciary duties 
prior malpractice judgments, a lack of malpractice insurance, or relevant 
experience. 
The second exception to the general rule that “silence is golden” 
occurs when a person fails to disclose material facts that are not 
reasonably discoverable.127  Normally, each party to a transaction has 
the burden of acting diligently to discover all relevant facts before 
entering into the transaction.128  This makes sense as a policy matter 
because otherwise there wou
otect their own interests.”129  But if the facts are not discoverable, it 
would be “futile to place the burden of discovery” on the party who does 
not have the information.130 
Because publicly available information about lawyers can be difficult 
or even impossible to obtain, as previously discussed,131 perhaps this 
exception should apply to the attorney–prospective client relationship, 
but again courts have applied this exception narrowly and have not 
applied it to attorneys.132  Furthermore, it is unlikely that courts will 
apply it to the lawyer–prospective client relationship in the future.133  
Instead, courts are likely to conclude that lawyer-specific information is 
reasonably discoverable “through inquiry and disclosure” for purposes 
of this exception.134  After all, at leas
available to consumers who perform a diligent search for that 
information, and, moreover, consumers can obtain other lawyer-specific 
information by asking the lawyer.135 
The final exception to the “silence is golden” rule is the obligation of 
a fiduciary “to disclose relevant information to a beneficiary because the 
fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence imposes a duty to 
136
 
 127. Id. at 539 (collecting cases).  See also Wolf v. Burngardt, 524 P.2d 726, 734 (Kan. 1974) 
(“Where one party to a contract . . . has . . . knowledge which is not within the fair and reasonable reach 
of the other party and which he could not discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence . . . he is 
ation that might help P to make a firm 
ting RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 553 (1999)). 
orn, supra note 88, at 541–42 (The primary application of this exception is to 
id. at 542. 
3. 
under a legal obligation to speak, and his silence constitutes fraud.” (citation omitted)). 
 128. Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 536 n.21 (“‘Just as D is under no obligation to rescue a 
stranger from peril, so too D need not disclose to P any inform
decision.’” (quo
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See supra Part I. 
 132. Johnson & Lov
real estate transactions.). 
 133. See 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 542–4
 136. Id. at 543. 
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es not have an established 
fid
rneys.  Neither the professional rules 
of conduct nor the law of fraud compels them to disclose lawyer-specific 
i
III. T C I A D O
phical concept of 
informed consent; (4) fulfilling prospective clients’ expectations; and (5) 
improving public co
 information 
as m o 
the
eir work during or after services 
lation that provides consumers with information about the 
professional services that they are seeking can help fill this information 
to prospective clients,137 the attorney do
uciary relationship with the prospective client under current law; 
therefore, this exception does not apply.138 
In short, silence is golden for atto
nformation to prospective clients. 
 HE ASE FOR MPOSING AN FFIRMATIVE ISCLOSURE BLIGATION 
ON LAWYERS 
This Part presents the theoretical, moral, and public policy arguments 
that justify imposing a duty on lawyers to disclose lawyer-specific 
information to prospective clients: (1) closing the information gap; (2) 
consumer protection; (3) the moral and philoso
nfidence in the legal profession. 
A. Closing the Information Gap 
A common justification for regulating professionals, including 
lawyers, is to rectify a market failure known as
ym etry.139  One commentator described the concept as it relates t
 market for professional services in the following way: 
 The theory of information asymmetries posits that wide information 
disparities exist in professional services markets (which includes . . . legal 
services) between providers and purchasers.  The theory’s premise is that 
professional services are highly specialized and highly skilled, and that 
very little specific information about the quality of professional services 
is available to the public.  Because of the sophisticated and often 
technical nature of these services, consumers typically lack the 
knowledge needed to understand and evaluate the little information they 
might have; to compare the value of services offered by competing 
professionals; or to judge the quality of th
are rendered.  In contrast, professionals in the field have the expertise and 
competence to make these judgments.140 
A regu
 
 137. See supra Part II. 
 138. Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 545–46. 
 139. Barton, supra note 3, at 437 n.26 (2001) (collecting sources). 
 140. Marina Lao, Discrediting Accreditation?: Antitrust and Legal Education, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1035, 1079 (2001). 
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ga
ion and 
ra
spective clients, which would help fill 
this cavernous information gap. 
B. Consumer Protection 
rvices market is the public policy 
jus
p.141 
The current state of the legal services market fits this model.  As 
previously noted,142 while regular users of legal services have access to 
information about their prospective lawyers through a network of 
contacts, less sophisticated users of legal services have difficulty finding 
critical information about their prospective lawyers and, even if they 
find it, they have difficulty evaluating that information.143  To make 
matters worse, although consumers are unable to find out negative 
information about prospective lawyers, they are bombarded by positive 
information about prospective lawyers through billboards, televis
dio advertisements, lawyer websites, blogs, and newsletters.144 
Regulation is therefore needed not only to fill the information gap but 
to balance the marketplace.145  The best way to address this problem is 
to create a regulation that provides information to legal consumers.146  
The proposal set forth in this Article requires lawyers to provide lawyer-
specific information to their pro
Related to the theoretical justification aimed at correcting the 
information asymmetry in the legal se
tification of protecting consumers. 
Imposing an obligation on lawyers to disclose lawyer-specific 
 
 141. Id. at 1080 (“Given the relative paucity of reliable information on professional services, 
professional self-regulation . . . generally benefits consumers because it fills the information gap and 
helps consumers select and evaluate a professional without incurring high search costs.”). 
 142. See supra Part I. 
 143. Barton, supra note 3, at 437 (noting that legal “consumers lack sufficient information to 
gauge the quality” of the lawyer). 
 144. See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text. 
 145. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 381 (“Since Bates, no significant marketplace 
realignments have been developed to offer client–consumers advantages complementing those gained by 
lawyers during this period.  In sum, disclosure advertising would help to bring about that balance of 
rights that each client–consumer requires in order to make a more economically efficient choice in the 
marketplace.”). 
 146. See Barton, supra note 3, at 485–86 (“[L]awyer disciplinary systems should be altered to 
allow the greatest possible flow of information to the public. . . . Disciplinary bodies should make all 
client complaints a matter of public record. . . . Lawyers who have been disciplined should be required 
to disclose the discipline to any new customers.”); DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 362 (Creating a 
“more fully informed marketplace will be more economically efficient.  In an increasingly information-
driven era, such a change seems consistent with cultural and marketplace forces of considerable 
vitality.”).  But see Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 533 (“For example, a lawyer presumably does 
not have to disclose to a client a disciplinary sanction in the nature of a private reprimand.  In that 
situation, there has already been a judicial or quasi-judicial determination that the public interest is best 
served by the reprimand being private, rather than public.”). 
26
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss2/9
COOPER FINAL FORMAT (PAGINATED) 3/18/2011  1:12:40 PM 
2010] ATTORNEY SELF-DISCLOSURE 723 
egal services and are therefore unfamiliar with the legal 
sy
ne for their case.   
Co
tive lawyer’s experience in order to decide 
w
s committed 
 
information will protect consumers, particularly those who are not 
regular users of l
stem.  These individuals rarely consult lawyers, and, when they do, it 
is typically under stressful circumstances such as a “divorce or criminal 
prosecution.”147 
Moreover, regardless of how stressful their situations are, these 
unsophisticated users of legal services tend to know little about lawyers 
and do not know how to select an appropriate o 148
mpelling disclosure of lawyer-specific information will give them 
information that they may not be able to find on their own and help them 
make a better decision about which lawyer to hire. 
Consumer protection is particularly important given the professional 
rules governing lawyer competency, which “free lawyers to compete for 
all types of legal work, regardless of how experienced or qualified they 
are.”149  The comment to the lawyer competency rule150 provides that 
the lawyer “need not necessarily have special training or prior 
experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is 
unfamiliar” and states further that lawyers can gain the required level of 
competence “through necessary study.”151  In other words, the rules 
governing lawyer competence provide that a tax lawyer can take on a 
divorce case as long as the lawyer takes the time to teach himself how to 
handle the divorce case.  Because the rules of professional conduct do 
not protect the consumer from hiring a lawyer without any relevant 
experience, it would seem particularly important for the consumer to 
know about a prospec
hether to hire such a lawyer; yet, under current law, the tax lawyer has 
no affirmative obligation to disclose to his prospective divorce client 
that he has never handled a divorce case. 
Perhaps most importantly, imposing a disclosure obligation would 
help protect legal consumers from dishonest lawyers.  Although the 
precise rate is unknown, “the limited data suggest that the rate of 
recidivism among lawyers who receive public sanctions is fairly 
high.”152  In light of the fact that a lawyer who ha
 147. Donna S. Harkness, Packaged and Sold: Subjecting Elder Law Practice to Consumer 
Protection Laws, 11 J.L. & POL’Y. 525, 538 (2003) (arguing that legal practice should be subjected to 
consumer protection laws).  See also Berenson, supra note 1, at 648–49. 
 148. Harkness, supra note 147, at 538 (citing Morton, supra note 4, at 284). 
 149. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 569. 
 150. Model Rule 1.1 requires that the lawyer have the “legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 
(2006). 
 151. Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 2. 
 152. Levin, supra note 12, at 3. 
27
Cooper: ATTORNEY SELF-DISCLOSURE
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
COOPER FINAL FORMAT (PAGINATED) 3/18/2011  1:12:40 PM 
724 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
mi
eterrent to 
lawyer misconduct.  If lawyers know that they are going to have to 
disclose misconduct to al  should cause them to be 
more careful about avoiding m 153 
 and philosophical justification for requiring 
la
sconduct in the past is more likely to commit future misconduct, legal 
consumers are entitled to know whether the prospective lawyer has been 
disciplined in the past so that they can protect themselves. 
Imposing a disclosure obligation would have one more significant 
benefit for consumers—it would serve as a significant d
l prospective clients, it
isconduct in the first place.
C. Informed Consent 
There is also a moral
wyers to provide prospective clients with additional information about 
themselves: the concept of informed consent, which is “deeply ingrained 
in American culture.”154 
Inspired by the informed consent doctrine in the medical field, legal 
ethics commentators in the 1970s and 1980s began advocating for a 
version of the informed consent doctrine in the law governing 
lawyers.155  The central goal of these commentators was to continue the 
movement away from the traditional paradigm of the lawyer–client 
relationship, in which lawyers controlled and directed the 
representation,156 to a situation where “clients, not lawyers, [would] 
 
 153. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 377 (“Such information could decisively affect the 
client’s selection of an attorney or a referring counsel’s choice of an attorney.  Viewed in this light, 
disclosure advertising of such sanctions could potentially pose a significant threat to some of the future 
business sought by the sanctioned attorney.  Thus, visibility in the marketplace should enhance sanction 
avoidance and act as a deterrent against inappropriate lawyer conduct.”); Levin, supra note 12, at 29 
oper, The Lawyer’s Duty to Inform 
ed Model of Attorney–Client Relationship: The Argument for 
to
yers as “fatherly 
stions beyond their clients’ authority.”  Id. 
(arguing that increasing the openness of disciplinary proceedings would deter lawyer misconduct). 
 154. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle For Truly 
Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 781 (1999).  This moral and philosophical 
principal also underlies a lawyer’s duty to inform a current client that the lawyer has committed 
malpractice during the course of the representation.  Benjamin P. Co
His Client of His Own Malpractice, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 174 (2009). 
 155. See, e.g., Troy E. Elder, Poor Clients, Informed Consent, and the Ethics of Rejection, 20 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 989, 1004 (2007); Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307 (1979); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and 
Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990); Gary A. Munneke, The Lawyer’s Duty to Keep Clients 
Informed: Establishing a Standard of Care in Professional Liability Actions, 9 PACE L. REV. 391 
(1989); Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revis
Au nomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1987). 
 156. Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1049, 1053 (1984) (noting that traditionally, lawyers held 
“decisionmaking power far beyond that of an ordinary agent”).  The first set of ethical rules—David 
Hoffman’s Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment—described law
guardians of a system laden with moral que
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y 
giv
 to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer 
ha
e client full 
information upon which to make an informed choice about which lawyer 
to hire puts the ith the lawyer 
and demonstrates respect  
 
make the most significant decisions in their cases.”157  The philosophical 
premises of the doctrine of informed consent—again borrowed from the 
medical field—are: (1) to support clients’ individual autonomy b
ing them information concerning their rights so that they can 
“effectively exercise those rights,”158 and (2) to respect clients’ human 
dignity by treating them as equals in the lawyer–client relationship.159 
The legal doctrine of informed consent has now achieved “doctrinal 
status”160 and has been enshrined in the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct; the Rules now require informed consent in approximately a 
dozen situations,161 and the term “informed consent” is itself defined 
along with numerous other concepts critical to the law governing 
lawyers in Rule 1.0.  The Rules define “informed consent” as “the 
agreement by a person
s communicated adequate information and explanation about the 
material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed 
course of conduct.”162 
As a moral and philosophical norm, the doctrine has continued to gain 
support,163 and the duty to disclose lawyer-specific information to the 
prospective client is rooted in this norm.  Informing the prospective 
client about the lawyer’s disciplinary history—or lack thereof—and the 
lawyer’s relevant experience respects the prospective client’s 
autonomous right to make the critical choice of whether to hire one 
lawyer or another.164  In addition, giving the prospectiv
 prospective client on an equal footing w
for the client’s human dignity.165
 157. Elder, supra note 155, at 1005. 
 158. Martyn, supra note 155, at 307. 
 159. Id. at 313. 
 160. Elder, supra note 155, at 1004.  See also Maute, supra note 156, at 1052 (“[T]he regulatory 
and ethical framework created by the Model Rules supports a new joint venture model for allocation of 
authority between client and lawyer.  Under this new model, the client is principal with presumptive 
authority over the objectives of the representation, and the lawyer is principal with presumptive 
authority over the means by which those objectives are pursued.”). 
 161. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a), 1.8(b), 1.18, 1.7(b)(4), 1.8(a)(3), 1.8(f)(1), 
1.9(a)(b), 1.11(a)(2), 1.11(d)(2), 1.12(a), 1.5(c), 1.5(e) (2006); see also Eli Wald, Taking Attorney–
Client Communications (And Therefore Clients) Seriously, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 747, 760 (2008). 
 162. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2006). 
 163. See Elder, supra note 155, at 1003. 
 164. Professor Berenson made a similar argument in favor of lawyer profiles: “The consumer 
sovereignty and autonomy arguments in favor of publicly accessible professional profiles are similar in 
the legal context to those in the medical context.  As consumers of legal services, potential clients will 
better be able to find appropriate legal representation the more they know about potential providers of 
such services.”  Berenson, supra note 1, at 680. 
 165. Martyn, supra note 155, at 313. 
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ation about 
themselves.171  Thus, im yers to disclose lawyer-
specific information will tations. 
the public’s lagging confidence in the legal profession, which is one of 
D. The Prospective Client’s Expectations 
Another reason to impose a duty on lawyers to disclose lawyer-
specific information is to meet the prospective client’s expectations.  
The prospective client approaches a meeting with his prospective lawyer 
much differently than he approaches a meeting with, for example, a 
plumber.  “Unlike the sale of cabbages, pick-up trucks, or insurance 
annuities, the usual marketplace ethos does not control” the attorney–
prospective client relationship.166  Lawyers promote themselves as 
“professionals,” not “profit-maximizing businessmen,” and use the 
cover of the professional code “to induce clients to use and trust” 
them.167  While people might question the qualifications of the general 
contractor renovating their house or expect their auto mechanic to try to 
rip them off, prospective clients see their prospective lawyers as zealous 
advocates—“aggressive and relentless in pursuing each client’s goals”—
and trusted confidants even before the representation has begun.168 
This expectation is reinforced by the fact that lawyers already owe 
prospective clients a wide variety of quasi-fiduciary duties as previously 
discussed.169  These duties, particularly the strict duty of confidentiality 
owed to prospective clients,170 strengthen the notion that the lawyer is 
someone whom the prospective client can trust and someone who will 
be forthcoming with the prospective client.  Given all of this, 
prospective clients likely expect that lawyers, unlike typical service 
providers like plumbers, will be concerned with more than just their own 
bottom line and therefore will disclose relevant inform
posing a duty on law
meet consumers’ expec
E. Public Confidence 
Finally, imposing a disclosure obligation on lawyers might help boost 
 
 166. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 396 n.222. 
6. 
rience.  A client who hires an attorney has no legitimate expectation that the 
 167. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 585–8
 168. Id. 
 169. See supra Part II.A. 
 170. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 591. 
 171. But see Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 547 (“Beyond this duty of reasonable care, 
courts should not blindly impose a duty of absolute and perfect candor on attorneys to relate information 
about credentials or expe
attorney will divulge every unfavorable fact relating to the attorney’s credentials or experience.  Rather, 
one expects an attorney to disclose what is important, to overlook what is not, and to exercise reasonable 
judgment in between.”). 
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the
ic client relationships and 
ab
t help restore the legal 
profession to its traditional leadership role.178 
 stated goals of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.172 
The public’s lack of confidence in the legal profession is a 
longstanding problem,173 and, if anything, the image of lawyers is 
getting worse.174  A report from the American Bar Association’s 
Litigation Section recently concluded that this lack of confidence stems 
from “the profession’s poor handling of bas
sence of attention to communication.”175 
Although creating the disclosure obligation might result in an initial 
flood of information about complaints against lawyers, which could 
have a negative impact on the legal profession’s image, in the long run, 
the public will appreciate lawyers’ willingness to “come clean.”176  The 
self-disclosure proposed by this Article is certainly not a cure-all, but a 
regime in which lawyers set themselves apart from other service 
providers by imposing on themselves an affirmative duty to prospective 
clients to disclose lawyer-specific information, including negative 
information, might help boost the damaged image of the profession.177  
Indeed, this regime of transparency migh
 
 172. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE ¶ 6 (2006) (“[A] lawyer should further the 
public’s understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal 
institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their 
authority.”). 
 173. See DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 353. 
 174. See, e.g., Harkness, supra note 147, at 541; Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625 
(1995) (upholding Florida’s thirty day ban on lawyer solicitation of accident victims as a legitimate 
“effort to protect the flagging reputations of Florida lawyers”); Judge Marcia S. Krieger, A Twenty-First 
Century Ethos for the Legal Profession: Why Bother?, 86 DEN. U. L. REV. 865, 866–67 (2009) 
(“American society is experiencing a Cycle of Cynicism that threatens public confidence in the law and 
legal institutions.  If we do not find ways to reverse this Cycle of Cynicism and restore public 
confidence, the cohesiveness of American society and our individual rights and freedoms will be in 
jeopardy.  Lawyers have the ability to combat this Cycle of Cynicism, but only if they are willing, as a 
profession, to explore, articulate and adopt a common commitment to a value greater than their self 
interest—to the Rule of Law.”). 
 175. See ABA Litigation Lawyers, http://www.abanet.org/litigation/lawyers/ (last visited Sept. 27, 
2010) (emphasis added). 
 176. Morton, supra note 4, at 292–93. 
 177. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 395 (“The suggestion of a new tradition espousing 
disclosure advertising . . . is designed to assist the profession in stemming the crisis of confidence by 
introducing true visibility to the system.”). 
 178. See id. at 397 (“If the bar becomes the first of our core institutions to commit itself seriously 
to such disciplinary visibility, its leadership mantle may be restored.  Visibility might become an 
energizing principle.  As such, it may aid not only in rebuilding the professional credibility of our legal 
institutions, but it might also help to mold a new tradition that other actors could come to emulate in a 
re-ordering and information-driven marketplace.”). 
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IV. COMPARING DOCTORS AND LAWYERS 
In determining an appropriate self-disclosure rule for lawyers, it 
seems natural to examine the regime governing doctors.  A comparison 
between disclosure requirements for doctors and those presently 
required of attorneys yields two important differences.  First, as set forth 
in subpart A, more information is publicly available about doctors than 
about lawyers making it much easier for consumers to find out 
physician-specific information than to find out lawyer-specific 
information.  Second, as set forth in subpart B, despite the general 
ility of significant physician-specific information, some c
evertheless found doctors liable for failing to reveal phys
ecific information to their patients.  As subpart C argues, this makes 
the case for the disclosure of lawyer-specific information even stronger. 
A. The Wide Availability of Physician-Specific Information 
It is much easier for a consumer to find an appropriate physician than 
it is for a consumer to find an appropriate lawyer.179  The main reason is 
that more information is publicly available about doctors.  All fifty states 
now have state laws requiring doctors to create physician profiles.180  
Although state requirements vary, the information in these profiles 
generally includes the kind of physician-specific information that
ts seek: demographic and educational background, lice
cations, malpractice suits, disciplinary history, and crim
nvictions.181  Thus, with a simple Google search, a patient can 
generally find out critical information about his prospective doctor.182 
B. Doctors’ Duty to Disclose Physician-Specific Information 
In addition to disclosing physician-specific information in publicly 
available physician profiles, in some situations physicians have had to 
 179. Berenson, supra note 1, at 648–56. 
 180. See Matthew E. Brown, Redefining The Physician Selection Process and Rewriting Medical 
Malpractice Settlement Disclosure Webpages, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 479, 483 (2005).  For links to each 
state’s physician profile webpage, see http://www.fsmb.org/directory_smb.html. 
 181. Berenson, supra note 1, at 657; Brown, supra note 180, at 483 n.31. 
 182. Moreover, doctor rating systems seem to be more widespread than lawyer rating systems.  
For example, two popular rating organizations—Angie’s List and Zagat—rate doctors but not lawyers.  
See Angie’s List, http://www.angieslist.com/AngiesList/Visitor/PressDetail.aspx?i=818 (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2010); Milt Freudenheim, Noted Rater of Restaurants Brings Its Touch to Medicine, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009, at B8.  At this time, the Zagat ratings are being compiled and edited by WellPoint, 
an insurance company, and the reviews are only available to WellPoint’s two million BlueCross plan 
members.  Id. 
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dern law.185  In 
oth
1990s,  Professors Aaron Twerski and Neil Cohen forecasted “a 
divulge this information directly to their patients.  Although most courts 
have not imposed this requirement on physicians, in the last two 
decades, some courts have held that doctors must disclose this 
information under the doctrine of informed consent. 
In the relationship between physician and patient, the doctrine of 
informed consent developed primarily as a protection for the patient 
against “unpermitted medical intrusion.”183  A patient who does not give 
informed consent to a specific medical procedure should be able to 
obtain damages under tort law—traditionally under a battery theory (i.e. 
unwanted touching,)184 and for negligence under mo
er words, the “current doctrine compels physicians to disclose 
information sufficient to allow patients to make voluntary, 
knowledgeable choices about their care,”186 and if the doctor obtains 
informed consent from the patient the doctor will not be liable.187  All 
fifty states recognize the informed consent doctrine.188 
Generally, a patient’s cause of action for informed consent is based on 
a physician’s failure to adequately inform the patient about the risks 
associated with a medical procedure,189 but in a pair of articles in the 
190
 
 183. Dayna B. Matthew, Race Religion, and Informed Consent—Lessons from Social Science, 36 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 150, 152 (2008); Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed 
Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 44–48 (1979).  Justice Cardozo provided the 
classic formulation of this justification: “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right 
to determine what shall be done with his own body.”  Scholoendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 
92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), superseded by statute, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(1) (McKinney 1975), as 
54, at 782 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON 
 who give 
 imposed on a non-
dical procedure that eventuate.”). 
form has been confined to the actual procedure and has not included provider 
ns to Each Other, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Twerski & Cohen, 
recognized in Retkwa v. Orentreich, 584 N.Y.S.2d 710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). 
 184. Martyn, supra note 155, at 311; Matthew, supra note 183, at 152. 
 185. Nolan-Haley, supra note 1
ON TORTS 190 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 186. Matthew, supra note 183, at 152; Nolan-Haley, supra note 154, at 781 (“In those 
transactions where informed consent is required, the legal doctrine requires that individuals
consent be competent, informed about the particular intervention, and consent voluntarily.”). 
 187. Matthew, supra note 183, at 152.  See also Joseph H. King, The Standard of Care for 
Residents and Other Medical School Graduates in Training, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 683, 718 (2006) (“This 
new kid on the block is the doctrine of informed consent.  This doctrine requires that a treating physician 
disclose the material risks of the contemplated medical procedure to his or her patient in order that the 
patient’s consent to the treatment be ‘informed.’  Failing that, liability may be
disclosing doctor for the material risks of the me
 188. King, supra note 187, at 718 n.154. 
 189. See DeGennaro v. Tandon, 873 A.2d 191, 196 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (“Traditionally, our 
review of this duty to in
specific information.”). 
 190. Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Comparing Medical Providers: A First Look at the New 
Era of Medical Statistics, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 5 (1992) [hereinafter Twerski & Cohen, Medical 
Statistics]; Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed Consent: 
Comparing Physicia
Informed Consent]. 
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d perform these 
pr
(3) cases in which patients claimed 
that they lacked adequate information about the physician’s level of 
experience.194  A ajority of these 
lawsuits, enough have succeeded that Twerski and Cohen’s predicted 
“re
 
second revolution in informed consent.”191  Professors Twerski and 
Cohen predicted that “[w]ith the advent of more extensive gathering and 
comparison of data” concerning physicians, patients would soon argue 
that they had the right to be informed not only of the “risks associated 
with the procedures” to be performed “but also about the relative risks 
associated with the medical providers who woul
ocedures.”192  In other words, patients who are injured in medical 
procedures would argue that they would “not have agreed to undergo a 
procedure with a ‘riskier’ physician had they been aware that a 
physician with a better track record was available.”193 
Although “revolution” may be too strong a word to describe what has 
transpired, Twerski and Cohen accurately predicted a significant 
increase in lawsuits alleging that physicians violated a duty to their 
patients by failing to disclose risks peculiar to the physician.  Plaintiffs 
have brought claims that fall into three categories: (1) situations in 
which the physician allegedly suffered from a physical or mental 
impairment; (2) cases in which the physician allegedly had a conflicting 
financial or research interest; and 
lthough courts have rejected a m
volution” may still come about. 
1. Physical or Mental Impairments 
Some patients have alleged that the physician should have to disclose 
a physical or mental condition that might affect the physician’s ability to 
treat patients or pose a particular threat to the patient.195  Courts that 
 191. Twerski & Cohen, Informed Consent, supra note 190 (emphasis added). 
 192. Twerski & Cohen, Informed Consent, supra note 190, at 3; Twerski & Cohen, Medical 
Statistics, supra note 190, at 28–29 (“[D]oes a provider have a duty to disclose information that 
identifies the provider as an independent risk factor?  The answer, we believe, is yes.  This information 
relates directly to the results likely to flow from a decision to have this provider perform this procedure.  
It is not difficult to conclude that a reasonable doctor should provide this potentially outcome 
determinative information to the patient and that a reasonable patient would want this information as 
part of the decision-making process.”).  See also Jennifer Wolfberg, Two Kinds of Statistics, the Kind 
You Look Up and the Kind You Make Up: A Critical Analysis of Comparative Provider Statistics and 
the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 585, 585 (2002) (“[I]t is just a matter of time before 
the rest of the country eventually follows suit with Wisconsin and broadens the doctrine of informed 
supra note 190, at 5. 
Experience to a Valid Informed Consent, 18 J. CONTEMP. 
EA 2). 
consent to include provisions of provider statistics.”). 
 193. Twerski & Cohen, Informed Consent, 
 194. See King, supra note 187, at 720–24. 
 195. Id. at 720 (collecting cases).  Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere, Doctor, Are You Experienced?  
The Relevance of Disclosure of Physician 
H LTH L. & POL’Y 373, 396–400 (200
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e that he was HIV-positive was a breach of the 
ph
hat a 
contrary holding would create because it would be impossible to define 
“which of a profession  be subject to such a 
disclosure requirement.” lvania appellate court 
he
ning a 
primary interest . . . tends to be unduly influenced by a secondary 
have considered such cases have come to widely different conclusions.  
For instance, in Faya v. Almaraz,196 the Maryland Supreme Court found 
that the jury should have been able to consider whether the physician’s 
failure to disclos
ysician’s duty to obtain informed consent.197  Similarly, in Hidding v. 
Williams,198 the Louisiana Court of Appeals found that a physician had 
breached his duty to his patient by failing to disclose his history of 
alcohol abuse.199 
But several courts have rejected similar claims.  For example, in 
Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland,200 the Georgia Supreme 
Court held that the physician had no duty to disclose his prior cocaine 
usage.201  The court was concerned about the slippery slope t
al’s life factors would
202  Similarly, a Pennsy
ld that a doctor had no duty to disclose that he suffered from 
alcoholism.203 
2. Conflicts of Interest 
Like lawyers and other professionals, health care providers often face 
“a set of conditions in which professional judgment concer
 
 196. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993). 
 197. Id. at 339.  See also Estate of Behringer v. Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1278–83 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991); Doe v. Noe, 690 N.E.2d 1012 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (imposing an 
absolute duty on physicians to disclose HIV status when seeking a patient’s consent to perform an 
invasive medical procedure which exposes the patient to the risk of HIV transmission).  Michelle 
Wilcox Debarge, Note, The Performance of Invasive Procedures by HIV-Infected Doctors: The Duty To 
5 CONN. L. REV. 991, 992–93 (1993) (collecting cases 
also Hawk v. Chattanooga Orthopaedic Group, P.C., 45 S.W.3d 24, 35 
en at the surgeon’s failure to disclose that he suffered from a 
aud’s Syndrome that affected the use of his hands was relevant to patient’s 
for
3, 216–17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“[M]atters such as personal 
, the professional corporations who offer their services, or the associations 
Disclose Under The Informed Consent Doctrine, 2
and arguing that courts should require HIV-positive doctors to disclose their status whenever they 
perform “surgical or invasive procedures”). 
 198. 578 So. 2d. 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1991). 
 199. Id. at 1197.  See 
(T n. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding th
condition called Rayn
in med consent claim). 
 200. 528 S.E. 2d 777 (Ga. 2000). 
 201. Id. at 782. 
 202. Id.  See also Prince v. Esposito, 628 S.E. 2d. 601, 604 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a 
chiropractor had no duty to disclose a prior battery allegation to his patients). 
 203. Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 21
weaknesses and professional credentials of those who provide health care are the responsibility of the 
hospitals employing them
which are charged with oversight.”). 
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re costs, with a resulting increase in the HMOs’ bottom line.206 
e t.”204  In other words, in some situations, doctors’ primary 
ponsibility—patient care—can be compromised by financial o
earch interests.  Such potential conflicts arise in a number of differen
ntexts.205  For example, in the context of managed health care: 
 The most fundamental source of conflicts of interest for the physician 
is the use of financial incentives in physician compensation schemes to
reduce costs.  Whereas the traditional fee-for-service system encouraged 
physicians to over-utilize medical services, thereby increasing health care 
costs, the modern compensation system provides incentives to physicians 
in various ways to under-utilize medical services, thereby decreasing 
health ca
Should physicians have to reveal that they are subject to potentially 
conflicting financial or research interests?  Again, courts are split, 
though the majority position is that doctors do not have to disclose such 
interests. 
The seminal case holding that physicians have a duty to disclose such 
interests is Moore v. Regents of the University of California.207  In 
Moore, the patient sought treatment for his hairy-cell leukemia at UCLA 
Medical Center, and his doctors recommended removing his spleen.208  
Without informing the patient, his doctors also made arrangements to 
conduct research on the patient’s spleen to develop valuable commercial 
products.209  After the surgery, the patient was asked to return repeatedly 
for follow-up care, during which his doctors took blood, bone, skin, 
 
 204. Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
573, 576 (1993). 
M L. REV. 775, 826–28 (2001) (discussing the financial incentives created by managed care 
ont
iding whether to 
may have an adverse impact on their income.”). 
al. 1990). 
1. 
t 481. 
 205. See Robert Gatter, Walking the Talk of Trust in Human Subjects Research: The Challenge of 
Regulating Financial Conflicts of Interest, 52 EMORY L.J. 327 (2003) (addressing conflicts of interest 
raised when health care providers engage in human subjects research); Margaret Z. Johns, Informed 
Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-Label Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS 
L.J. 967, 1012 (2007) (arguing that physicians should have to “disclose off-label prescriptions and 
conflicts of interest resulting from drug-company marketing”); Thomas L. Hafemeister & Sarah P. 
Bryan, Beware Those Bearing Gifts: Physicians’ Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 
57 U. KAN. L. REV. 491 (2009) (discussing conflicts of interest created by the marketing efforts of 
pharmaceutical companies); George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class Access to 
Legal Services and What We Can Learn From the Medical Profession’s Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 
70 FORDHA
c racts). 
 206. Harris & Foran, supra note 205, at 819.  See also Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 
AMA, Ethical Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330, 331 (1995), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ ceja_13a94.pdf (“[M]anaged care can place the needs of patients in 
conflict with the financial interests of their physicians.  Managed care plans use bonuses and fee 
withholds to make physicians cost conscious.  As a result, when physicians are dec
order a test, they will recognize that it 
 207. 793 P.2d 479 (C
 208. Id. at 480–8
 209. Id. a
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mic interest that might affect the 
ph
terests.  For example, in D.A.B. v. Brown,  the Minnesota 
Co
ian to induce him to prescribe the hormone: “The doctor’s 
duty to disclose the kickback scheme presents a classic informed consent 
issue.”214 
Despite an increasing number of conflicting personal and financial 
interests, most courts have rejected Moore, particularly where the claim 
s t or failed to disclose his financial arrangement with an 
M
marrow, and sperm samples from him that were used to develop a 
valuable patented cell line without any disclosure to the patient of the 
doctors’ financial interests.210  The California Supreme Court concluded 
that Moore’s doctors had an obligation to disclose their financial and 
research interests to him: “[A] reasonable patient would want to know 
whether the physician ha[d] an econo
ysician’s professional judgment.”211  In other words, although the 
doctor might have delivered the exact same treatment regardless of his 
financial interests, “the possibility that an interest extraneous to the 
patient’s health has affected the physician’s judgment is something that 
a reasonable patient would want to know in deciding whether to consent 
to a proposed course of treatment.”212 
Several courts have followed Moore, holding that a health care 
provider has a duty to disclose potentially conflicting financial or 
research in 213
urt of Appeals held that physicians who had prescribed a synthetic 
growth hormone drug were obligated, under the auspices of informed 
consent theory, to disclose that the drug distributor made payments to 
the physic
i hat the doct
H O.215 
 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 483. 
 212. Id. at 484. 
 213. 570 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). 
 214. Id. at 171.  See also Heinrich v. Sweet, 308 F.3d 48, 69 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[A] doctor who 
proposes an experimental course of treatment must not only tell the patient about the treatment and its 
consequences but must also inform the patient that he is conducting an experimental treatment and that 
the patient is part of a study.”). 
 215. Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 504–05 (Ill. 2000) (concluding that a physician does not 
have a duty to disclose financial incentives to withhold necessary medical treatment that arise out of the 
physician’s contract with the patient’s managed care organization); Greenberg v. Miami Children’s 
Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1070–71 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (rejecting claim that 
physician had duty to disclose researcher’s financial interests).  See also Harris & Foran, supra note 205, 
at 827 (“[C]ourts have been reluctant . . . to apply [the informed consent] doctrine to require disclosure 
of financial incentives in managed care contracts.”); William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: 
Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1750 (1999) (“With respect to 
informed consent, managed care has raised new questions about the extent to which physicians’ existing 
disclosure responsibilities should be modified to reflect the changed economic environment of clinical 
practice and the resultant threat to the integrity of agency relationships.  Specifically, courts must 
determine whether the scope of required disclosure should extend beyond the physical risks of treatment 
to other matters that shape patients’ access to treatment, course of care, and clinical outcomes.  
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3. Lack of Experience 
The third type of claim asserted by patients—and the claim that 
Twerski and Cohen were most focused on in their prediction of a 
“revolution”216—is that physicians have a duty to disclose to their 
patients their level of experience and training.  Several courts, beginning 
with the landmark Wisconsin Supreme Court case, Johnson by Adler v. 
Kokemoor,217 now recognize such a claim, though most courts continue 
to reject this theory of liability. 
In Johnson, the plaintiff–patient, who suffered from an aneurysm, 
alleged that his surgeon did not provide sufficient information about his 
experience with the particular type of challenging surgery involved.218  
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the patient was entitled to 
know about the defendant’s lack of experience with this surgery, the 
difficulty of the proposed surgery, and the fact that different physicians 
have “substantially different success rates” with the same medical 
procedures.219  Following Johnson, a Wisconsin appellate court held that 
a doctor must disclose: “1. The extent of his experience in performing 
the type of operation; 2. A comparison of the morbidity and mortality 
statistics for the type of surgery with other physicians; and 3. Referral to 
a tertiary care center staffed by more experienced physicians.”220 
Outside of Wisconsin, a few courts have chosen to follow Johnson 
and have held that a physician has a duty to disclose information about 
his experience and training in at least some circumstances.221  In a 
slightly different context, the Connecticut Court of Appeals concluded 
that: 
Can d 
inc r 
exa n 
compensation arrangements and other financial interests.  To date, most courts have resisted requiring 
so-called ‘physician-specific’ disclosure.”). 
didates for disclosure include information about physicians’ individual biases, skills, expertise, an
entives, as well as external constraints on their ability to pursue their patients’ medical interests.  Fo
mple, informed consent law is beginning to consider the relevance to patients of physicia
 216. Twerski & Cohen, Informed Consent, supra note 190, at 1. 
 217. 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996). 
 218. Id. at 507. 
 219. Id. at 507–08. 
 220. Prissel v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., No. 02-1729, 2003 WL 22998133, at *7 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Dec. 23, 2003). 
 221. See Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Del. 1997) (holding that the trial court erred 
in excluding expert testimony about defendant–physician’s “failure to inform his patient of his lack of 
recent aneurysm surgery”); Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 157, 165–66 (Md. 2000) (given the “expanding 
era of more complex medical procedures, group practices, and collaborative efforts among health care 
providers . . . the identity of the persons who will be performing aspects of the surgery” and “who, 
precisely, will be conducting or superintending the procedure or therapy” must be discussed and 
resolved, “at least if raised by the patient”); see also King, supra note 187, at 722 n.169 (collecting and 
analyzing cases). 
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rcumstances of the particular situation suggest that such 
the duty to inform encompasses provider specific information where the 
facts and ci
information would be found material by a reasonable patient in making 
the decision to embark on a particular course of treatment, regardless of 
whether the patient has sought to elicit the information from the 
provider.222 
In that case, a dentist had failed to inform his new patient, who was 
injured during the procedure, that he “was understaffed, was using 
equipment with which she was unfamiliar and was using an office that 
was not ready for business.”223 
The rationale of Johnson and its progeny—the more experienced the 
doctor, the better the medical case—makes sense and is supported by 
empirical data.224  Thus, “[a]ny contention that a reasonable patient 
would consider his or her physician’s level of experience immaterial to a 
procedure, particularly an invasive procedure, is clearly contradicted by 
real life experiences.”225 
But Johnson and its progeny have been criticized for, among other 
things, imposing a potentially unworkable regime on physicians.  As one 
commentator has written: “Would the Johnson holding mean that 
virtually any surgeon within ninety miles of the Mayo Clinic must 
essentially apprise his patients of the option of going to the Mayo 
Clinic?  In other words, where is the stopping point once we start down 
that informed consent road?”226 
In part recognizing this criticism, several courts have rejected 
Johnson-like claims.  For example, in Whiteside v. Lukson,227 the 
defendant–surgeon failed to disclose to the patient that, although he had 
trained for the particular surgery by performing it on pigs, he had never 
 
 222. DeGennaro v. Tandon, 873 A.2d 191, 196 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005). 
nformed Consent, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 543 (2002) (arguing that 
ate.  See Walt Bogdanich, At V.A. Hospital, a Rogue Cancer Unit, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2009, at 
Twerski & Cohen, Medical Statistics, supra note 190, 
t 27 ment). 
 (Wash. 1997). 
 223. Id. at 197. 
 224. Twerski & Cohen, Informed Consent, supra note 190, at 13 n.30.  See also Brad M. 
Rostolsky, Comment, Practice Makes Perfect: Experience-Related Information Should Fall Within The 
Purview of Pennsylvania’s Doctrine of I
Pennsylvania should follow Wisconsin). 
 225. Iheukwumere, supra note 195, at 413–14.  A recent incident at a Veterans Administration 
hospital in Philadelphia drives home the danger to patients when a physician—even a well-credentialed 
one—lacks experience in performing a particular medical procedure.  In that case, the doctor, who has a 
medical degree from Johns Hopkins and a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania, had only limited 
experience with a relatively routine procedure called brachytherapy in which radioactive seeds are 
supposed to be implanted into the prostate to treat prostate cancer.  In multiple instances, the doctor 
allegedly botched the procedure by implanting them in the patients’ healthy bladder rather than the 
prost
A1. 
 226. King, supra note 187, at 724.  But see 
a –28 (disputing the slippery slope argu
 227. 947 P.2d 1263.
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rt held that “a surgeon’s lack of experience in 
performing a particular surgical procedure is not a material fact for the 
purpo ched 
similar conclusions.
e lawyer settled his client’s case for 
$1
 
done the procedure on a human.228  Even though the physician botched 
the procedure, the cou
ses of . . . informed consent.”229  Several other courts have rea
230 
C. What Lawyers Can Learn from the Experience of Doctors 
Why are doctors’ disclosure obligations relevant to lawyers?  First, 
there is no reason why it should be easier for a consumer to find out 
information about a prospective doctor than about a prospective lawyer.  
To be sure, there are differences between doctors and lawyers.  For 
example, it is easier to objectively determine a doctor’s success rate 
through statistics like survival rates than it is to determine a lawyer’s 
track record.  When the defens
00,000, was that a “success?”  Such a settlement is perhaps a success 
if a trial would have yielded a $200,000 judgment against the client, but 
we can never know this for sure. 
But from the consumer’s standpoint, the similarities between doctors 
and lawyers are greater than the differences.  Doctors deal directly with 
their patients’ health, but lawyers are often asked to help patients with 
equally critical issues involving their clients’ life, liberty, and property.  
Moreover, just like the attorney–client relationship, the doctor–patient 
relationship is perceived differently than the typical relationship between 
buyer and seller.  “Unlike the sale of cabbages, pick-up trucks, or 
insurance annuities, the usual marketplace ethos does not control” a 
consumer’s relationship with his lawyer or his doctor.231  In medicine, as 
in law, patients do not know what questions to ask their doctors, and 
 228. Id. at 1264. 
 229. Id. at 1265. 
 230. See Mitchell v. Kayem, 54 S.W.3d 775, 781 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (Physician was not 
required to inform patient of more experienced surgeon or a different hospital.); Duttry v. Patterson, 771 
A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001) (“[E]vidence of a physician’s personal characteristics and experience is 
irrelevant to an informed consent claim[.]”); Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 952, 958 (Haw. 1997) 
(declining “to hold that a physician has a duty to affirmatively disclose his or her qualifications or the 
lack thereof to a patient”); Foard v. Jarman, 387 S.E.2d 162, 167 (1990) (No affirmative duty for health 
care provider to discuss his experience with patient); Abram v. Children’s Hosp. of Buffalo, 542 
N.Y.S.2d 418, 419 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (rejecting argument that informed consent required disclosure 
of qualifications of staff participating in plaintiff’s surgery); Thomas v. Wilfac, Inc., 828 P.2d 597, 601 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (Informed consent “requires disclosure of material facts relating to treatment, not 
disclosure of a physician’s qualifications.”); see also Barry R. Furrow, Doctors’ Dirty Little Secrets: The 
Dark Side of Medical Privacy, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 283, 289–90 (1998) (stating that the law has 
s disclosure of physician risk). consistently avoided a rule of informed consent that require
 231. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 396 n.222. 
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tion available to them as consumers of medical services.  
“If
erience with a particular procedure, he will at 
lea
society does not expect them to know.232  As one court stated: “We 
discard the thought that the patient should ask for information before the 
physician is required to disclose.  Caveat emptor is not the norm for the 
consumer of medical services.”233  This is also true with respect to 
lawyers and questions about legal services.  Given these similarities, 
there is no reason that consumers of legal services should not have the 
same informa
 information about experience and success rate is material to selecting 
a doctor, then it is also at least arguably relevant to selecting an 
attorney.”234 
If anything, legal consumers need even more information about their 
prospective lawyers than medical consumers need about their doctors.  
Doctors are encouraged to specialize, and receive special training and 
certification in their field.  Although a consumer probably will not know 
whether a doctor has exp
st know that if he has a heart problem he should see a cardiologist, 
and he can be confident that the cardiologist has significant expertise in 
treating heart problems. 
By contrast, the professional regulation of lawyers encourages 
generalization, not specialization.  As noted earlier, the lawyer 
competency rules provide that a lawyer “need not necessarily have 
special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type 
with which the lawyer is unfamiliar.”235  As a result, “lawyers often are 
willing to perform a spectrum of services without specialized training 
even when true specialists in the field exist.”236  To make matters worse, 
the organized bar has made it nearly impossible for consumers to 
identify appropriate specialists.  In most jurisdictions, lawyers cannot 
claim specialization unless they obtain very specific accreditation.237  In 
some states, the opposite problem exists—those states either do not 
regulate claims of specialization at all or they impose insufficiently 
rigorous training on lawyers who want to claim specialization.238  This 
is just as problematic for the consumer because he cannot rely on a 
lawyer’s specialization claim.  This makes it even more difficult for a 
consumer to hire an appropriate lawyer, and as a result, the legal 
 
 232. King, supra note 187, at 740 (citations omitted). 
 233. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 234. Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 574. 
 235. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2006). 
 236. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 583. 
 237. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.4 (2006) (limiting claims of specialization 
to lawyers who have obtained very specific accreditation); see also Zacharias, supra note 3, at 583, 583 
n.32. 
 238. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 584–85. 
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co
ers.  
While this Article does not predict a “revolution” in legal malpractice 
claim ake 
these kinds of claims  the near future.  Lawyers can avoid any 
po
poses an amendment to the rules of professional conduct 
that would require lawyers to disclose lawyer-specific information to 
prosp  and 
anticipates som
req
e lawyer.”  This language 
ec
nsumer is more likely than the medical consumer to hire a 
professional who lacks the appropriate expertise.  Imposing an 
obligation on lawyers to disclose lawyer-specific information would 
help solve this problem. 
The other lesson that lawyers can learn from the experience of doctors 
is that, despite the fact that consumers can learn more about their 
prospective doctors than about their prospective lawyers, there is a 
growing trend of patients suing doctors for their failure to disclose 
physician-specific information.  Although the majority of courts have 
ruled against patients who have brought these claims, the decisions that 
have come out in favor of patients are a cautionary tale for lawy
s, it is certainly possible that creative plaintiffs’ lawyers will m
 in
tential liability simply by disclosing lawyer-specific information. 
V. PROPOSAL FOR DISCLOSING LAWYER-SPECIFIC INFORMATION 
Having demonstrated the need for self-disclosure of lawyer-specific 
information, the next issue is what form that disclosure should take.  
This Part pro
ective clients, describes the content of the proposed disclosure,
e of the potential criticisms of the self-disclosure 
uirement. 
A. An Amendment to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.18, which sets forth the 
lawyers’ duties to Prospective Clients, should be amended to impose a 
duty on lawyers to communicate with prospective clients that is similar 
to the duty to communicate with current clients.239  The amendment, 
modeled on Rule 1.4 about communication with current clients, should 
read: “A lawyer shall disclose lawyer-specific information to the 
prospective client to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the 
prospective client to make an informed decision regarding whether to 
form an attorney–client relationship with th
hoes current Rule 1.4(b), which requires a lawyer to “explain a 
matter” to a current client “to the extent reasonably necessary to permit 
 
 239. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2006). 
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sing and Certification Information; (2) 
Re
 information” and the 
ac
 “It was a one-time mistake 
that will not happen again;” “I only settled that malpractice case because 
my insurance company wanted to.”  Thus, the lawyer can integrate any 
negative information from required disclosures into all of the positive 
 
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation,”240 
and therefore should be familiar to lawyers. 
This language should not stand on its own, however; rather, the rules 
should more specifically define the lawyer’s self-disclosure duty.  
Adding more detail to the regulation will help ensure that it delivers its 
intended consumer protection and will also let lawyers know what they 
can do to make sure that they are complying with the regulation.  In 
order to clarify the lawyer’s new duty, the amendment to Rule 1.18 
should define the “lawyer-specific information” that must be disclosed 
as “specific information about the lawyer that a reasonable person would 
find material to his or her selection of a lawyer.”241  Moreover, the 
comments to the amended Rule 1.18 should provide that the lawyer will 
generally satisfy his duty to communicate “lawyer-specific information” 
by disclosing the following categories of information to the prospective 
client: (1) Biographical, Licen
levant Experience and Expertise, including an explanation of why the 
lawyer’s prior experience is relevant to the prospective client’s case; (3) 
Disciplinary History; (4) Information Regarding Malpractice Insurance; 
and (5) Malpractice Payments. 
While the definition of “lawyer-specific
companying comment will provide important guidance for lawyers 
and prospective clients, the overall regulation is flexible enough to 
account for unforeseen situations that call for disclosure of information 
yet do not fall within these specific categories. 
The rules should not require lawyers to make these self-disclosures in 
any particular form, but instead allow lawyers to make the disclosures in 
whatever way they feel most comfortable.  Lawyers might decide that 
the best way to make the disclosures is to incorporate them into their 
sales pitch and, in that way, provide appropriate context.  For instance, 
they can preface any negative information that they have to disclose by 
informing consumers that these disclosures are required by the rules of 
professional conduct.  Moreover, lawyers can provide truthful and 
appropriate disclaimers along with their disclosures: they can provide 
clients with additional information, such as, “I have not handled any 
cases just like that, but I do not know if you will find anybody in town 
who has and I have a lot of trial experience;”
 240. See id. R. 1.4(b). 
 241. This definition should be included in Model Rule 1.0, which defines the terminology used in 
the rules. 
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information typi
asy for the lawyer to provide, and the 
requirement that lawyers provide this information should prove 
“relatively unobje
choice for this matter.249  It may seem odd to impose this burden on the 
cally used to attract clients. 
B. Categories of Mandatory Disclosure 
1. Biographical, Licensing and Certification Information242 
Lawyers should inform prospective clients of the colleges and law 
schools that they attended, the dates of graduation, and the degrees that 
they received.243  In addition, lawyers should disclose where they are 
admitted to practice law, the dates of admission, and any specialty 
certifications.244  Even though all of this information is generally 
available elsewhere, it would be better for the consumer to have it all in 
one place.  Furthermore, it is e
ctionable.”245 
2. Relevant Experience and Expertise 
As previously discussed,246 consumers, specifically unsophisticated 
users of legal services, need specific information about a prospective 
lawyer’s experience and “expertise in matters like the client’s matter”247 
so that the consumer can make an informed choice about whether to hire 
the lawyer.248  A simple list of the lawyer’s relevant past matters is a 
starting point, but it is insufficient because consumers who are 
unfamiliar with the legal system might have difficulty understanding the 
relevance of the lawyer’s past experience to their case.  Therefore, the 
lawyer must also carefully explain why the lawyer’s experience is 
relevant and why his experience makes him a suitable or unsuitable 
 
 242. See Berenson, supra note 1, at 683 (recommending that this information be included in the 
). 
formation at the retainer 
 proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate 
lawyer’s profile
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See supra Part I. 
 247. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 592–93. 
 248. For more sophisticated consumers, such as large corporations and wealthy individuals, the 
disclosure need not be as extensive because they have a better understanding of the relative merits of 
hiring the lawyer, and moreover, they know what questions to ask to find out what they want to know 
about the lawyer.  See id. at 605 (“If lawyers have obligations to provide in
stage that parallel their obligations toward existing clients, the codes arguably envision that lawyers will 
tailor their advice to the sophistication and needs of each prospective client.”). 
 249. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (2006) (defining “informed consent” to mean 
“the agreement by a person to a
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itable for 
the
at the lawyer 
ca
ctive client.  The pitch 
just needs to include appropriate disclaimers.252 
prospective lawyer, particularly if it requires the lawyer to give the 
consumer information that might cause the consumer not to hire the 
lawyer, but it is critical.  Unless the consumer hires another lawyer to 
help him choose a lawyer, the only person in a position to help a 
prospective client determine whether a prospective lawyer is su
 client’s particular case is the prospective lawyer himself.250 
How will this work?  It is not enough for the lawyer to tell the client 
simply that he is a litigator or even that he is a plaintiff’s side litigator or 
even that he is a plaintiff’s side medical malpractice litigator.  Rather, 
the lawyer needs to disclose exactly what kind of experience and 
expertise he has and how that is relevant to the prospective client’s case.  
Significantly, this disclosure does not need to be a death knell for the 
lawyer’s chances of winning the business.  Indeed, in many cases, the 
lawyer’s relevant experience and expertise will be a selling point.  Even 
in the event that the lawyer has never handled a case exactly like the 
prospective client’s case, that does not mean that the lawyer cannot or 
should not handle the prospective client’s case251 or th
nnot successfully earn the prospective client’s business. 
For example, assume the prospective client comes to the lawyer’s 
office for a consultation on a claim that her baby died during delivery as 
a result of the obstetrician’s malpractice.  Assume further that the lawyer 
has never handled a case with those allegations but has successfully 
handled a number of medical malpractice claims involving allegations of 
botched plastic surgery.  Under a self-disclosure regime, the lawyer must 
disclose that he has not handled a case involving alleged malpractice 
during delivery, but the lawyer can explain how his own experience is 
relevant and beneficial.  The lawyer can explain that all medical 
malpractice claims are similar in some respects, that he is well-versed in 
the state’s medical malpractice law, that he has vast trial experience, that 
he has had great success both at trial and with obtaining pre-trial 
settlements, and that he has had success suing this particular hospital.  In 
other words, nothing in this proposal prevents the lawyer from making 
the same pitch he normally would to the prospe
 
information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the 
proposed course of conduct”). 
 250. See Zacharias, supra note 3, at 587–88 (“Unless one can assume that prospective clients are 
lly  understand the need for independent fu  capable of negotiating for their representation or that they can
advice before signing retainers, the prospective lawyers seem to be in the sole position to guide the 
clients.”). 
 251. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2006). 
 252. There are limits on what the attorney has to disclose.  For instance, the attorney’s disclosure 
need not go so far as to inform the prospective client that there is a cheaper alternative, see Posting of 
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3. Disciplinary History 
In deciding whether to hire a lawyer, consumers place great 
importance on whether the lawyer has ever been disciplined.253  
Consumers use this information to help them decide whether a 
prospective lawyer is honest and trustworthy.  Given the importance of 
this information to consumers and their inability to discovery it on their 
own, attorneys should be required to disclose all public disciplinary 
actions taken against them.254 
In addition to public disciplinary actions, almost all jurisdictions 
impose private discipline as a form of punishment, and “in many 
jurisdictions, it is the type of discipline most often imposed.”255  There 
is no principled basis for not requiring lawyers to disclose any private 
disciplinary action taken against them.  In cases of private discipline, “a 
lawyer has been found to have engaged in misconduct, but his reputation 
is protected on the theory that the lawyer is not someone from whom the 
public needs protection.”256  As Professor Levin points out, “there is no 
evidence . . . that disciplinary counsel or hearing boards—which 
typically impose private sanctions—are capable of determining whether 
the lawyer is likely to engage in similar misconduct in the future.”257  To 
the contrary, there is some evidence that lawyers who committed 
misconduct in the past are more likely to commit misconduct in the 
future.258  Accordingly, the lawyer should have to disclose private 
discipline because the interest of the consumer outweighs the lawyer’s 
interest in privacy.259 
Andrew Perlman to Legal Ethics Blog, www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2009/03/an-ethical-obligation-
to-tell-your-client-about-a-cheaper-alternative.html#comments (Mar. 5, 2009, 09:59 PM) (concluding 
that lawyer probably does not have a duty to disclose to his client the existence of a cheaper option, 
whether that option is a lower biller inside the firm or a cheaper lawyer outside the firm) or to offer the 
name of another lawyer who could handle the case.  See Zacharias, supra note 3, at 580 (“Imposing 
upon lawyers a referral obligation would require them to conduct an inquiry into the market that they 
otherwise might never undertake.”).  One California case held that an attorney had a duty to refer the 
client to a specialist, but there the attorney–client relationship had already been established and the 
referral was necessary in order for the lawyer, who lacked expertise in tax matters, to meet his duty of 
care.  See Horne v. Peckham, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714, 720 (Ca. Ct. App. 1979). 
 253. Morton, supra note 4, at 287–88; DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 376–77. 
 254. Berenson, supra note 1, at 685. 
 255. Levin, supra note 12, at 20. 
 256. Id. at 24. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 29. 
 259. Again, the lawyer’s disclosure of prior discipline does not need to ruin his chances of 
winning the client’s business.  In making the disclosure, the lawyer can include appropriate 
explanations—I was young; it was a one-time problem; I used to be an alcoholic, etc. 
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claims.”  
 
4. Information Regarding Malpractice Insurance 
As previously discussed,260 consumers naturally want to know 
“whether or not the attorney who they are considering retaining carries 
malpractice insurance,”261 so that the consumer will be able to recover if 
his lawyer commits malpractice.  Despite the ABA’s recognition of this 
issue’s importance—via its model rule on the subject262—most states 
currently do not require lawyers to disclose this information.263  If 
plumbers advertise that they are “insured and bonded”—presumably 
because customers want to know this information before they hire them 
in case something goes wrong—surely legal consumers are entitled to 
know the same information about their lawyer. 
5. Malpractice Payments 
Just as consumers want to know whether a prospective lawyer has 
ever been disciplined because it may make that lawyer more likely to 
engage in misconduct in the future, consumers also want to know if a 
prospective lawyer has ever made a malpractice payment because that 
might indicate that the lawyer is more likely to commit malpractice in 
the future.264  Professor Berenson wisely suggests that disclosure of 
malpractice payments be limited to those above a “nuisance value” of 
$5,000.265  To be sure, malpractice payments are not necessarily proof 
of anything—in some cases the lawyer decides to settle because it is 
easier and less expensive than fighting—but the lawyer is entitled to 
provide the appropriate context to the consumer when he makes the 
disclosure.  For example, if appropriate, the lawyer can explain that the 
lawyer’s practice involves “cases that generate [a high] proportion of 
malpractice 266
C. Anticipating the Critics 
Imposing a requirement on lawyers to disclose lawyer-specific 
information is not a perfect solution.  It is also not likely to be a popular 
idea among lawyers, who will resist a rule that requires them to reveal 
 260. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 261. Berenson, supra note 1, at 684–85. 
 262. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 263. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 264. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 265. Berenson, supra note 1, at 684. 
 266. Id. 
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negative information about themselves.267  But will it really hurt 
lawyers? 
As an initial matter, the context in which this information will be 
disclosed is important.  The proposed rule would allow a lawyer to make 
the required disclosures in whatever way he wants.  If, for example, the 
lawyer discloses a limited amount of negative information in the context 
of a sales pitch in which the lawyer is touting his many positive 
qualities, it is hard to see how the lawyer will be particularly damaged. 
Further, a self-disclosure regime might hurt lawyers who have 
damaging information to reveal, but a regime of self-disclosure will 
actually help those attorneys who have no negative information to 
reveal.  They can even tout this by telling prospective clients, for 
example: “the rules of professional conduct require lawyers to reveal 
whether they have ever been disciplined, and I am proud to tell you that 
I have never had a single complaint filed against me.” 
A self-disclosure regime will hurt lawyers who try to take on cases 
that they are not equipped to handle because they will be compelled to 
disclose their lack of relevant experience and expertise.  But again, to 
the extent that self-disclosure drives consumers to lawyers with more 
relevant experience and expertise, this is a reason to praise the rule, not 
condemn it.268 
Certainly, at the beginning of a self-disclosure regime, the legal 
profession’s reputation as a whole might take a hit as the market is 
flooded with negative information about lawyers that was previously 
kept private.  But, in the long run, a self-disclosure regime might 
actually have a positive economic benefit for lawyers and the legal 
profession: “Even the most cynical, business-driven lawyer . . . should 
recognize that restoring consumer confidence in our legal institutions 
also has positive long-term business benefits.”269 
Another likely criticism is that this issue should be left to the free 
market.  In other words, some will argue that the burden should be on 
the consumer to investigate prospective lawyers and discover this 
 267. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 362 (“A move toward requiring greater visibility of 
lawyer discipline or trial court sanctions would be controversial, however, because it might be seen as a 
threatening departure from the status quo.”).  Id. at 380 (“The long history of invisible discipline 
suggests that attorneys, as business-generating professionals, resist the publication of negative 
information.”). 
 268. One relevant concern is that a self-disclosure regime will have a disproportionately negative 
effect on junior lawyers who are trying to get a foothold in a competitive market.  Junior lawyers can, 
however, tout other desirable qualities: “I will work harder;” “I will be more communicative;” “My rates 
are lower;” etc.  Moreover, to the extent that a self-disclosure regime moves the legal profession even a 
little bit toward the kind of apprenticeships we see in the medical profession, it may be beneficial. 
 269. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 397. 
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information themselves.  After all, there are a number of helpful guides 
produced by bar associations and consumer protection groups,270 and at 
least some information is publicly available on the Internet and through 
other means.  Perhaps most importantly, the client can simply ask the 
prospective lawyer for information, and the lawyer must provide truthful 
answers.271  There are several strong counter-arguments.  This Article 
already addressed the shortcomings of consumer guides.  Even if 
consumers find them and follow them, they do not provide the kind of 
information necessary for consumers to make an informed decision 
because not all of the necessary information is publicly available.272 
Moreover, relying on consumers to ask questions is a heavy burden 
for consumers to bear for a variety of reasons.  First, consumers, 
particularly unsophisticated consumers, may not know what questions to 
ask.  Second, “the usual marketplace ethos does not control” the 
attorney–prospective client relationship.273  Lawyers promote 
themselves as “professionals,” not “profit-maximizing businessmen,” 
and use the cover of the professional code “to induce clients to use and 
trust” them.274  While people might question the qualifications of the 
general contractor renovating their house or expect their auto mechanic 
to try to rip them off, prospective clients see their prospective lawyers as 
zealous advocates—“aggressive and relentless in pursuing each client’s 
goals”—and trusted confidants even before the representation has 
begun.275  Indeed, “only the most sophisticated and experienced clients, 
such as corporations represented by in-house counsel, are likely to 
undertake [the] form of investigation”276 that would yield the lawyer-
specific information that prospective clients need to make an informed 
choice about the selection of a lawyer.  Third, in the absence of 
regulation, lawyers have no incentive to provide this information to 
prospective clients and might not be completely forthcoming even when 
asked direct questions.277  Thus, although lawyers must answer 
prospective clients’ questions truthfully, they do not necessarily have to 
answer them fully.  Without a disclosure requirement, the lawyer might 
answer questions truthfully but not provide the full information that the 
 270. See supra Part I. 
 271. See supra Part II.B. 
 272. See supra Part I. 
 273. DeGraw & Burton, supra note 9, at 396 n.222. 
 274. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 585–86. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 595. 
 277. Id. at 577 (“A consulted lawyer often will have personal incentives not to address a 
prospective client’s lack of information because the client’s focus on the information may cause her to 
seek representation elsewhere or not to seek legal representation at all.”). 
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client needs to make an informed decision.278 
Another argument that will be raised against this proposal is that it 
constitutes a violation of lawyers’ privacy.279  While some of the 
required disclosures proposed in this Article might prove embarrassing 
to lawyers, it is difficult to see how the disclosures compromise their 
privacy.  First, much of the information is already publicly available 
(albeit difficult for consumers to find).  For example, most state bars will 
disclose disciplinary information to those who ask.280  Likewise, 
malpractice judgments are public records accessible to those who know 
where to look.281  Similarly, state bars are increasingly requiring lawyers 
to provide them (but not prospective clients) with information regarding 
their malpractice insurance.282  Moreover, because the information that 
lawyers would disclose relates to their professional lives as opposed to 
their personal lives, it is difficult to see how they have a significant 
expectation of privacy.  That expectation of privacy is reduced to the 
extent that the information is already public.  In short, because much of 
this information is publicly available already and lawyers have little or 
no expectation of privacy in the information, any “marginal reduction in 
lawyer privacy that would result . . . is greatly outweighed by the benefit 
that would be provided to consumers.”283 
CONCLUSION 
This Article attempted to describe and ameliorate a longstanding and 
vexing problem: the inability of consumers to learn critical information 
about prospective lawyers.  This lawyer-specific information is 
surprisingly difficult to find even with a diligent search, and lawyers 
have no obligation under current law to reveal this information to 
consumers.  This scarcity of information makes it difficult for 
consumers to find an appropriate lawyer to handle their case. 
This Article proposed a novel approach to solving this problem.  The 
rules of professional conduct should be amended to require a lawyer to 
disclose sufficient “lawyer-specific information” to enable prospective 
clients to make an informed decision about which lawyer to hire.  At a 
minimum, this disclosure should include: (1) basic biographical, 
 278. See Brigid McMenamin, 10 Things Your Lawyer Won’t Tell You, SMART MONEY, Sept. 18, 
2003, http://www.smartmoney.com/spending/deals/10-things-your-lawyer-wont-tell-you-14764/. 
 279. Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 88, at 560–61 (arguing for privacy rights). 
 280. See supra Part I.B. 
 281. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 282. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 283. Berenson, supra note 1, at 682. 
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licensing and certification information; (2) disciplinary history; (3) 
information about the lawyer’s malpractice insurance; (4) malpractice 
payments; and (5) the lawyer’s specific experience and expertise 
relevant to this matter as well as an explanation of the relationship 
between the lawyer’s prior experience and the work that will be 
necessary in the proposed new matter. 
Several arguments support this proposed amendment.  First, lawyers 
already owe prospective clients a variety of quasi-fiduciary duties.  
Indeed, the only significant duty that they do not owe prospective clients 
is the duty to communicate, which is arguably the most important duty.  
Imposing this duty on lawyers would be consistent with the quasi-
fiduciary nature of the lawyer–prospective client relationship. 
Second, this Article identified five theoretical, moral, and public 
policy justifications supporting this proposed amendment.  This 
requirement would help solve the problem of information asymmetry 
that plagues the market for legal services.  Additionally, a self-disclosure 
requirement would provide important protection for consumers.  
Disclosing lawyer-specific information to the prospective clients so that 
they can make an informed decision is also consistent with the moral 
and philosophical notion of informed consent, which serves the twin 
goals of supporting clients’ individual autonomy by giving them 
information concerning their rights so that they can “effectively exercise 
those rights” and respecting clients’ human dignity by treating them as 
equals in the lawyer–client relationship.  Further, an affirmative 
disclosure requirement is consistent with what consumers expect from 
prospective lawyers.  Finally, this self-disclosure requirement would 
improve public confidence in the legal profession. 
A comparison with doctors and their disclosure obligations provides a 
further argument in favor of requiring lawyers to disclose lawyer-
specific information.  There is no reason that it should be easier for 
consumers to find information about prospective doctors than 
prospective lawyers.  Moreover, by voluntarily disclosing lawyer-
specific information, lawyers can avoid the kinds of claims that doctors 
are now facing for failing to disclose physician-specific information. 
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